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STRAINED RELATIONS, IMPACTED MEMORIES: THE TRAJECTORY OF THE GREEK COMMUNITY OF TÜRKİYE AND CYPRIOTS WITHIN TÜRKİYE-GREECE CONTEXT

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ABSTRACT

Continuous tension between Greece and Türkiye has demonstrated severe consequences for the Greek community in Türkiye. Since the foundation of the new Republic, the community has faced extinction through various policies and actions. While other minority groups have also experienced detrimental effects, it must be taken into account that the most influential factor on the Greek minority has been Greek-Turkish relations. The tension has had adverse effects on the community while enhancement of the relations enabled to comfort. Historical relations with Greece and internal policies of Türkiye that has impacted the Greek community since the foundation of the Republic up to the EU process of Türkiye are the main domains of the study. Major milestones of events are explored in the timeline indicated. In the context of Greek-Turkish relations, Cyprus issue plays crucial role. Therefore, this research sheds light on the Cyprus question with particular attention on the context of outcomes on Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Differentiating from the previous studies, this research emphasizes oral histories and personal reflections on the topics with the support of testimonies. The testimonies involve individuals from Greek immigrant descendants in Greece, Greek minority members in Türkiye, and Cypriots.

Keywords: Türkiye, Greece, Cyprus, Greek minority, Cypriots, EU,

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

KTC – Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti (Cyprus is Turkish Association)

MAH – Milli Emniyet Hizmeti (National Security Service)

TMT – Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Resistance Organization)

TMGT – Türkiye Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı (Türkiye National Youth Organization)

TMTF – Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu (Türkiye National Student Federation)

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1 INTRODUCTION

Beginning of the 19th century has marked the turning point in the history for the presence of the empires. Formed of different nationalities, empires faced with the revolts and uprisings against the authorities. The successful ones were managed to form their own state and take back their occupied lands.

Likewise, the Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman empire had struggled to maintain its status quo within the changing dynamics of the new border's formation. The nations had fought for independence and recognition from the empires that they were under the control. The nations being defined by the religions they follow, Christian ethnicities of the empires of demanded their autonomy. The Empire tried to resolve the issue by recognizing the rights of the empire in a certain extent through the reforms. However, the inapplicability and the already formed sense of nationhood led them to gain independence. The independence of the nations formed states in the Balkans.

One peculiar country that was formed was Greece beyond question. Armenians, Greeks and Jews being the main non-Muslim groups of the empire, Greeks were the old habitants of the land before the arrival of the Turkish tribes. Gaining the independence from the Ottomans did not prevent the further dissolution of the Ottoman lands. Mainly the Armenian and Greek minorities demanded the lands where they formed the majority. Encountering with the resistance of the Turkish nationalists, the Greeks of the Asia Minor had to flee to the Greece mainland.

The Greece received approximately 1.5 million refugees from Asia Minor which makes almost all citizens of the country related with someone who is Asia Minor descendant. The country that went through a major demographic change being neighbor to its former 'occupier' had new set of relations with the successor state.

Since the foundation of the Republic, discriminative practices and regulations were applied against the non-Muslims. These practices were correlated with the country's fear of internal enemies that resonated from the demolish of the empire. The nationalist founders of the country insisted with the practices that identity and religion were integral for the political objectives and the loyalty; thus, the sense of security could be achieved solely through an ethnoculturally pure society (Shields, 2013, p. 6).

The relations between Türkiye and Greece were highly affected by the power control over the island of Cyprus. Formed with the Greek and Turkish ethnicities, the island was in the attention of Greece and Türkiye. Starting from 1950s, both countries' international agenda was evolved around Cyprus. On the other hand, the clashes between the Cypriot communities were intensified after the independence from the British. The involvement of the guarantor states in the conflict resulted in tremendous consequences both for Cypriot communities but also the Greeks in Türkiye.

In 1955, Cyprus problem escalated the tensions between Greece and Türkiye leading to an organized pogrom against the Greeks of Istanbul. Disrupted trust of the communities to the Turkish state accompanied with economic difficulty and mental unease of the non-Muslim groups (Torne, 2015, p. 404). Hundreds of shops, churches and properties were destroyed, many were injured, and some casualties occurred.

Nevertheless, the independence of the island could not secure peace on the island that shortly lived independent Cyprus faced with two diverse demands of the communities. Both parties have demonstrated distinguished demands and strong suspicion against one another (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 60). The conflict on the island paved a way for the expulsion of the major part of the Greek residents of Istanbul. Although, the rights were secured through Lausanne Agreement, the government ceased the opportunity to deport the internal enemies of the Republic. Thus, the vitality of the state was ensured.

Following the years, the number of the Greeks of Türkiye was even decreased, making the community as almost extinct on the ancestral lands. The community being affected by the discriminative policies of the state encountered with the implications after the re-escalation of the conflict in Cyprus. Although, the community members were disassociated with the Greek Cypriots, the minority suffered the consequences of the turmoil in the island. Certainly, the Cyprus problem has not been only an alibi for Türkiye to occupy the 38 percent of the island, it has also laid the foundation for the internal change to dismiss the Greeks. Furthermore, the Greeks were pressured to convince Greece on Cyprus issue.

The tense climate between Greece and Türkiye replaced by a more prosperous relation in 1990s. The betterment of the relations was no in doubt the result of Türkiye's accession process in the EU. The strengthened economic ties, tourism between the countries and finally the earthquake diplomacy where both countries have exhibited enormous efforts with their search and rescue teams were final marks of the decade for the relations between the two countries. The same year marked the admission of Türkiye into the candidate countries for the EU. Regardless of the core challenges in politics Türkiye and Greece have enhanced the preservation of stability and peace in the region (Koukoudakis, 2015, p. 96).

The following years and with the newly elected government, Türkiye positioned itself to accommodate the EU standards by adjusting reform policies. However, the reform policies have been insufficient to meet with the *acquis*. Nevertheless, the country seemed incapable on protection of human rights and democracy as well as reducing the power of military in governance.

In international relations, a new approach was adopted. The hardline policy of Türkiye on Cyprus was softened, and Türkiye supported the reunification of the island as its membership was tied upon this condition. However, the approach was changed when Cyprus was admitted into the EU

without the conditionality of reunification which led the rejection of the proposed plan. Türkiye, being frustrated in the matter, declined its strong EU approach aftermath of its counterparts' accession. Although, the talks were started in 2005, the decline in the interest led Türkiye to abandon its progress in the protection of human rights and rule of law. The Greek minorities as being a recognized ethnic minority in Türkiye managed to resolve some of the community issues they have faced since the foundation of the Republic. However, the minority fear of Türkiye was escalated after 1980s with Kurdish uprisings. Few minority problems were resolved with the discrepancy between de facto and de jure on the issues (Toktas and Aras, 2010, p. 713). Declining numbers of the Greek minority and the demands of the Kurdish population led Türkiye to encounter with another minority question. Therefore, analyzing Türkiye's EU path with respect to its internal reforms and international relations focusing on Cyprus is crucial factors to understand the situation of Greek minority in Türkiye as well as Greek-Turkish relations.

The membership of Cyprus in the EU not only affecting the accession process of Türkiye but also the situation of the Turkish Cypriots on the island has become a limbo. The hopes for the reunification were diminished for a long term. The people of North Cyprus encountered with difficulties linked to being dependent on Türkiye and living in an unrecognized country. Political and financial isolationism of the North Cyprus impedes the Turkish Cypriot future prospects and everyday life (Palacios, 2020).

The aim of the thesis is to discover impact of historical dynamics between Greece and Türkiye on the Greek minority of Türkiye since the foundation of the Republic. Even though the Republic was founded on secular foundations, the importance of religion and the efforts to create a homogeneous society had a strong influence on this community, especially those known as internal traitors. Unfortunately, the establishment of the republic and the end of the continuity of the Ottoman nation system did not lead to a significant change in the rights and equal rights of this community. On the contrary, in the first 50 years, it was thought that the minority population could not be assimilated due to the fluctuating religious factor, which was the most important factor for the minority population, and they were made to emigrate abroad as they were clearly not wanted.

Even though some recent developments were seen with the EU prospective, the changes were not stable as those steps were taken with the aim of joining the EU rather than improving the condition of the minority groups as it should be in democratic countries. On the other hand, with the high number of emigrations, Türkiye's fear of Greek minority was almost eradicated. Rulers of the modern Türkiye realizing that the common religion with a group is not forming a ground for the assimilation started to face with the Kurdish self-determination demands.

In order to analyze the proposed statements, the literature part of the thesis will focus on the analysis of the historical-political dynamics between Greece and Türkiye and its reflection on the Greek minority. The second chapter is based on the interviews with the individuals belonging to Greek minority in Türkiye, the descendants of the Greeks from Asia Minor or Istanbul and Cypriots. The testimonies target to humanize the traumatic past with the collective memory research, the individual perception of the intercommunity dynamics and international relations, community concerns, and the method the community perceives itself and the surrounding as well as the international political dynamics.

The dissertation is taking a particular approach in covering the knowledge gaps in literature with the combination of the oral histories as well as humanizing the events and the consequences of the state actions. The testimonies have also been carried out in accordance with the events and timeline analyzed in the literature. This unique study aims to provide a glimpse of discovering the dynamics evolved in between Türkiye, Greece as well as Cyprus with regards to its impact on the Greek minority and the Cypriots.

2 METHODOLOGY

The dissertation has been divided into two chapters as literature review and the testimonies. The literature review has been conducted mainly through JSTOR article database. Included press releases supported the argument on the literature review. The published consist of Turkish, Greek and international scholars. The scarcity of the sources published by the Greek and English scholars captures the attention. Particular themes that have been pivotal moment for the Greek community in modern Türkiye such as Wealth Tax and 1964 Expulsions have been authored limitedly by the Greek scholars. Moreover, the lack of collaborative work between Turkish and Greek scholars is particularly concerning. The collaborative works could provide more impartial approach on the topics that concern the history of Greece, Türkiye, and Cyprus.

The timeline of the historical conjecture has been determined considering the significant events that has been the turning point for the diplomatic relations between Greece and Türkiye in the context of Greek community as well as Cyprus. However, the internal dynamics and policies of Türkiye were investigated in order to determine the correlation with the foreign policy. Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus and the EU process have been the primary determinants that affected the internal policy toward the Greek minority. Due to the involvement of the Cyprus issue in the agenda of Greece and Türkiye in 1950s, the impact of the issue on the Cypriot communities have been studied. In a scholarly context, shared suffering of Cypriots and Greek communities have been discovered. Even though, the two communities were unrelated to each other, perceived linkage of the

Greek minority of Türkiye to the Greek Cypriots paved a way to the declining numbers of the community.

The second chapter involves the qualitative research through the interviews conducted with the participants from Türkiye, Greece, and Cyprus. The interviews aimed to discover the oral histories with collective memory, personal opinions and community objectives on the issues. The questions of the interview have been selected in accordance with the themes defined such as collective memory, community and individual identity formations, traditions and heritage, hopes and concerns. Each category of questions has been asked to each section of the interview participants: Greek minority member, Greek immigrant descendant in Greece and Cypriot communities. The categorial questions have been accommodated depending on the location and generation. Analysis have been conducted under each theme of the questions. The challenges have been faced on participant research for the Greek community descendants and Greek minority members in Türkiye. The issues have been related to lack of knowledge on the family history and limited number of community members. The ages of the participants range between 20-30 except a Greek-Cypriot participant and the Greek immigrant descendant participant in Greece. In total six interviews were conducted as one Greek minority member in Türkiye, one Greek immigrant descendant in Greece, one Turkish Cypriot and three Greek Cypriots.

The interviews have been conducted on Teams platform with the voice recordings. The participants have given their oral consent prior the interview and the written consent after the interview allowing the usage of data solely with the purpose of the thesis research. Participants were allowed to use pseudonym or the original name.

The data and the literature research aimed to increase the liability through the comparative analysis and involving scholars with different approaches. The interviews aimed to include of at least one person for each section of affected populations in Greece, Türkiye, and Cyprus.

3 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review concentrates on exploring events and developments in the history of Republic of Türkiye with regards to Greece-Türkiye relations and its implication on the minority regime of Türkiye. Being associated with Greece and perceived as internal enemies, the Greek minority of Türkiye has been the most affected from the relations. Furthermore, the dynamics between Greece and Türkiye evolved around the Cyprus issue that both countries power projected through the Turkish and Greek communities of the island. Thus, the literature review will involve the developments of the 20th century and EU accession process of the island.

3.1 *Towards the Republic*

The wind of nationalism that was initiated in Europe had multiple implications on the empires that home to multiple ethnicities. In this context World War I marked as the turning point in the history. The ethno-religious tensions within the Ottoman Empire led the start of the independence struggle of the nations and consequently, the new territorial adjustments. The dissolution of the Empire raised the question on the situation of the minorities in the new Republic. Being the natives of the land, minorities encountered with the adverse effects of the homogenization policies of the Republic which was interconnected with the diplomatic path Türkiye follows.

Ottoman Empire as expanded to three continents was home to diverse cultures but unlike the contemporary states, multiculturalism was not a policy option. Undoubtedly, as the empire being a theocratic state that follows the Islam religion, people who followed Christianity or Judaism were autonomous in practicing their faith, organization of their community, and in educational matters; however, they were considered as in the lower status than the Muslims. The system is called ‘millet’ system and in this system, non-Muslims were separated to three main categories: Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jews. Other Christian groups were such as Assyrian Orthodox and Arab Christians. However, the ‘millet’ system was based on the religious identity of the groups in determining the status of individuals. Indeed, individual liberties were absent in the empire and community rights derived from the Islamic faith regulations.

The wind of nationalism that occurred in Western Europe disseminated quickly by affecting the nationalities of Balkans and the status-quo the empires hold. The Christian nations of the Balkans gained their independence after winning in their independence wars. It can be stated that the nations were paying the centuries of oppression they faced during the Ottoman rule (Goalwin, 2018, p.127). As the first wave of migration from the Balkans was during and after the Balkan Wars, the migration gained speed and at the end of 1912 the number of Muslims who migrated to Anatolia reached 100.000 (Erdal, 2014, cited in Metintas, 2018, p.4).

Decline of the Ottoman Empire after the 16th century exacerbated by the self-determination claims of the nationalities. Although under Ottoman rule, minorities had control over aspects of their communal life such as taxes, religion, and education, the situation of the non-Muslim communities started to experience a significant shift as European states intervened in the Ottoman Empire under the scheme of “protecting minorities” (Shields, 2013, p.2). The non-Muslim minority of the empire largely gained the support of the European powers in return of geopolitical and economic advantages (Schechla, 1993, p. 245). The support of the European powers for the minority population of the empire and the increasing wave of nationalism led territorial claims in basis of the protection of the Christian nations existing in the Ottoman. In other words, population’s sympathy leaned towards the

state's external enemies made the European powers as the brothers of Christians in the empire (Blanchard, 1925, p. 450).

3.2 *Establishment of the Republic: Towards a More Inclusive Future or Continuity of 'Millet' System*

The new Republic of Türkiye was founded on 29 October 1923. Unlike the old empire, the new Republic embraced secularism and Republicanism. However, the changing dynamics and being the successive state raised the questions on the treatment of minority groups and how to tackle with the issue. Even though, the approach and policies towards the minority groups have changed throughout the years and adjusted with the evolving situations within and outside of the Republic, the issue remained as a complex, unresolved question.

The initial years of the Republic marked as the turning point for the minority rights in Türkiye. Although, the ethnicities were diverse, the recognized minority groups were Armenians, Greeks, and Jews with rights secured through Lausanne Agreement. In fact, the agreement aimed to provide equal citizenship with the features of the specific groups (Icduygu and Soner, 2006, p. 453) However, due to the untrust between the communities and keeping the Christian minorities responsible for the demolition of the Ottoman Empire, the problems persisted in the new Republic. Citizenship rights were not enjoyed equally by all the citizens regardless of the ethnicity and religion. The non-Muslims were deprived of access to certain occupations, establishing foundations, acquiring and selling properties.

While the citizenship rights of minorities have improved over time, there have also been times when they have oppressed. In terms of the Greek minority, it can be argued that this decline was mostly due to the worsening relations with Greece. Not only the Greek minority in Türkiye but also Turkish and Greek communities of Cyprus were also affected by the worsening relations between Türkiye and Greece. The distrust of the minorities in the early years of the Republic was reinforced by problems with the country that was seen as their homeland and served as an excuse for the homogenized society that was aimed to be created.

The last major progress on the minority rights has been thanks to the EU negotiations and Türkiye's long lasted desire to be part of the union. Although, the recognized minority rights were improved who were Jews, Armenians, Greeks; Muslim minorities and other Christian groups which fell outside of the recognized minorities such as Arab Christians, Alevites, Assyrians have continued to be deprived of the similar rights.

The secularism has been among the six principles of the Republic. The role of religion on political and social spheres were restricted and reserved for the private. Nevertheless, the Muslim

identity privileged and Christians were associated with outside forces and referred as nonreliable residents. While Muslimhood remained intact to achieve Turkishness, the non-Muslimhood was the natural obstacle to achieve Turkishness (Yegen, 2004, p. 58). The contradiction on the definition of role of religiosity in Turkishness and secular principles aimed to follow in the Republic represents the asymmetry in the practice and theory of citizenship (ibid.). This Muslim formulation of nationality equality and non-discrimination was granted to the Muslim citizens regardless of the sub national characteristics they had while denying the public expression of the sub nationalities (Icduygu and Soner, 2006, p. 456).

Another needed element for the new nation's creation was Turkishness. It was not enough Turkish citizen, and Turkishness was also an important factor to be considered a full citizen. However, Turkishness was not meant to include only those of one race. It is a more inclusive and expandable context. In the definition of Turkishness, inclusion and exclusion were determined based on religion, not ethnic, or linguistic (Akturk, 2009, p. 893). This determination formed the present-day Kurdish and Alevi demands for their sectarian and ethnic recognition (ibid.). Turkishness was also open to non-Turks, but not to all (Yegen, 2004, p. 57). This is why non-Turks living outside Türkiye were accepted into Türkiye, while some non-Turkish groups living in Türkiye were asked to leave (ibid.). Thus, it is demonstrated that admission to be Turkish was determined if the prospective ethnic group or persons are from the Muslim faith. With the adoption of secularism in the Republic, religion was brought under state control, thus trying to prevent religious interference in state affairs. Instead of being a factor regulating social life, religion was left to people's private sphere of life.

Considering the place of faith in practical application, the situation was a little different in theory. Regarding the definition, the constitution adopted in 1924 says the following about Turkishness: "The people of Türkiye regardless of their religion and race would in terms of citizenship be called Turkish." Therefore, the Turkishness mentioned on the Article 88 signifies that there is another Turkishness different from the political one and implies not all the citizens are from Turkish race.

Grigoriadis (2011) states that the Turkish national identity remained voluntaristic for the Muslims but organic in the case of non-Muslims which refers to the fact that integration and full citizenship rights were available to Muslim citizens as long as they adapt Turkish language and culture (Grigoriadis, 2011, p. 175). Arabs, Circassian or Laz descent who embraced the Kemalist Republican principles and willing to adapt the Turkish culture were welcomed meanwhile those who wished to maintain their ethnic identity were discriminated (ibid.). On the other hand, those who wish to assimilate to Turkish culture and language from the non-Muslim groups were not welcomed. Even though, some individuals converted Islam to acquire the full citizenship rights, they were criticized

by the society for their Christian past. Various terms involved to describe the non-Muslims in Türkiye such as guest citizens, citizens of foreign country or local foreigners (Grigoriadis, 2011, p. 176). All the terms were used to emphasize their inferiority and otherizing of the non-Muslim communities.

Akturk (2009) sharing a similar opinion with Grigoriadis mentions that the members of the Turkish nation were allowed to have different ethnic origins with a Muslim background in creation of the nation while citizens with Muslim and non-Muslim are treated unequally which national historiography of the Republic tells the opposite (Akturk, 2009, p. 897). Indeed, speaking of the citizens and nations, Akturk (2009) also points out to the gap between citizenship and nationhood. Particularly, in the early Republican period, full exercise of the citizenship rights was reserved to the Muslims due to the distrust to minority groups. This puts forward that the even though the new Republic aimed to modernize and secularize itself, the minority policies were not so different than the Ottoman period. While groups with different religions living in the Ottoman Empire were associated with the faiths they had, such as Greek Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, and Jewish, it was accepted that communities with these beliefs were a nation during the Republican period, but the discriminatory attitude could not be completely removed. While the Republic united the non-Muslim groups living within the borders under the laws of the Republic of Türkiye in administrative matters, it did not leave them under the regulatory and administrative authority of their own communities.

Goalwin (2018) in his published article mentions that Turkish elite put effort on creating a secular sense of Turkish identity even though the public viewed religion as the essential for the in groups (Goalwin, 2018, p. 167). However, the Turkish national movement contributed to the formation of the low level of social identity complexity (ibid.). He further elaborates that the relationship between citizenship and immigration was defined on the base of the faith while the relationship between religion and national identities were interchangeable meaning Turkish and Muslim referred (ibid.). The same identity and those who are outside of the Muslim/Turkish group would not be Turks (ibid.). Therefore, the policies of the new state aimed to assimilate Muslim minorities and excluding the non-Muslims (ibid.). Thus, it can be asserted that Muslim identity can be conceived as an umbrella identity that could merge other identities under it as a unified Turkish identity. Indeed, Kadirbeyoglu (2009) points out that this made-up collective identity, which owns the name of one of the ethnic groups (the Turks), was implemented through educational and cultural spheres (Kadirbeyoglu, 2009, p. 294).

Aslan (2007) argues in his published work that the followed by the long years of wars and disintegration, social and economic transformations within the Ottoman Empire between the

communities advanced the differences, eventually Muslimhood becoming the definition for Turkish identity (Aslan, 2007, p. 258).

Although Turkishness was important, the loyalty of non-Muslim citizens to the state was also important. This could be understood from their interaction with Muslims. If they formed a self-contained community, this was considered dangerous. The Armenians and Greeks turning to their own communities, establishing close relations with Europeans towards the end of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent war created a fear in the Turkish elite about the possibility of the similar scenario repeating itself.

Goalwin (2017) in his article on the exclusionary politics of the early Turkish nationalism he emphasized boundary formation in which institutional order, the distribution of power and the extent of political networks were effective (Goalwin, 2017, p. 5). Hence, explaining the Turkish identity formation through ethnic or civic terms are not sufficient. According to him, the modern states were bounded by the sense of national community idea, and it promotes the development of distinctive national ethnic groupings that set them apart from non-members (ibid.). Ethnic identification and rebuilding of the social life are centered around the ethnic and national groupings in the institutional structure of the modern state and societies as well as political structures are evolved around (ibid.). The distribution of power in the social sphere restricts strategies for the actors to impose order (ibid.). Positions in the social hierarchy determines the ethnic differentiation needed for the social boundaries and maximize the benefit for the ingroup while minimizing for the outgroup (ibid.). The size of social networks has an impact on when and where ethnic borders are formed (ibid.). In his theory, expansion is possible through the integration of outsider categories to build a group identity that includes existing ethnic, religious, cultural boundaries in the nation state which is done through privileging a specific ethnic group. To sum up, Goalwin (2017) explains multiple actors were effective in the Turkish nationalism (Goalwin, 2017, p. 16). His theory puts forward that why Turkish nationalism was not solely centered around the Turkishness in a secular state but tried to assimilate Muslim minorities while leaving the Christian minorities aside and deprived of the certain rights.

3.3 Building Nations, Exchanging Populations: 1920 Greece-Türkiye Population Exchange

Worsening situation of the Greek minority starting with the Balkan wars exacerbated by the Greek invasion of Anatolia in 1919 which initiated the tragic events that resulted in displacement of the Christians from their ancestral lands (Shields, 2013, p. 1). Continuous attempts of the Ottoman empire to secure the order through violence exacerbated the loss of the governance in the periphery (Giannakos, 2008, p. 22). By the terms of the 1920 Sevr Treaty that Allies were enforcing upon the

Ottomans, Greek troops invaded Anatolia in order to protect the rights of the Greek minority as stated in the Article 14 (Giannakos, 2008, p. 21). The Great Powers unable to control the situation in Smyrna, the Greeks launched the military invasion in the hopes of occupying Ankara and exchanging it in return of Istanbul; however, encountering with the counterattack of Turkish nationalists, Greeks had to withdraw their troops leaving the Christian population there as the next target of the Ankara government to expel the Christian population from Anatolia (Giannakos, 2008, p. 25). Even though the new government was secular, having the Christian population in the new country meant possibility of having the same problems as the Ottomans had in the past. The new country was born with the traumatic idea that the Christian population which had the most important economic sources and occupations at their hand once betrayed the empire although they were attempted to be consolidated by the empire forces.

Upon the defeat of the Greek Army by the organized troops of the newly established government of Ankara, questioning the loyalty of the Greek minority sought the solution by exchanging the population in an agreement with Greece. The nationalists rallied behind Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the Turkish resistance, who upheld isolationist principles and sought positive relations with neighboring countries (Metintas, 2018, p. 11). As Greece being one of the neighboring countries, it has been thought that positive relations would prevent any future dispute. Because of the past trauma that Christian population was controllable from outside and bore the possibility to rebel, the government has worked to minimize the number of Christians as possible in order to reduce potential risks and for the establishment of good relations with the neighbors. It was crucial for them to adhere to international law and official documents, as they aimed to encircle Türkiye within the boundaries outlined in the National Pact formulated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the struggle for independence (ibid.). Consequently, providing justifications based on official records was essential for national leaders to prevent potential international backlash in the future and sustain prosperous relations with the global community.

The concerns and the demands regarding the exchange has been diverse. İsmet İnönü who is among the founders of the Republic insisted on a later date for the exchange to take place due to the lodgment issues and the demand to include Istanbul and İzmir in the agreement; on the other hand, Venizelos demanded that the exchange should be on a voluntary basis (Guner, 2007, p. 1455).

Eventually, the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos initiated the process by proposing a compulsory exchange of the Greek and Turkish population and asked for making the required adjustments from the League of Nations High Commissioner Fridtjof Nansen. (Shields, 2013, p. 4). The relevant articles were prepared by him considering the needs and demands of both sides. However, the races in the Article 1 of the Greek-Turkish Population Agreement as follows:

“As from the 1st of May 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in the Greek territory” (Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1924, p. 84).

Indeed, Nansen had defined the races according to the religion of the communities and neither the spoken language nor the follow of traditions had its importance. Turkish speaking Orthodox community of Karamanlis and the Greek speaking Muslim communities of Greece were no exception in this treaty. A Pemako who was not Turkish racially had seen more acceptable because of their Muslim identity. Likewise, the government accepted the Muslims of Crete without considering their ethnic identity. Millions of people were expelled from their ancestral lands to live in another country where they neither speak the language nor practice the tradition.

The Greek-Turkish Population Exchange proves that even in the first years of the Republic, a newly formed secular state had relied on the religious identity in its definition of nation. The Turkish nationalist elite had two main goals: first, eliminating the Greek and Armenian irredentist claims by ensuring the territorial integrity of Anatolia; second, securing the idea of ethnocultural homogenized Republic (Eligur, 2017, p.5). The Greco-Turkish Population Exchange placed a greater emphasis on achieving homogeneity and excluding certain groups rather than addressing the needs of refugees or engaging in geopolitical negotiations with humanitarian concerns in mind (Goalwin, 2018, p. 129). Indeed, the wellbeing of the mobilizing populations and humanitarianism were the terms that were not considered at the time. However: it should be noted that, after the years of long wars and casualties in the civilian populations, the wellbeing of the communities should have been kept in first place while drafting the accords. Thus, even after a century, the memory is being carried out to the next generations and the pain of unconsidered agreement decisions endure.

Even though the exchange was designed to make the nations more homogenized, the diversity kept its place especially in the case of Türkiye. The countries sought for the homogeneity in order to prevent any sort of war in the future and Turkish elite embraced the idea that the diversity was the underlying cause of the war with Greece. Therefore, in the primary years of the new country there have been a few interventions through the political excuses in order to exterminate the remaining Christian minority population.

Even though, the newly immigrating populations from the Balkans were not ethnically Turkish, the Muslim identity they had was a unifying force between the Anatolian and the Balkan Muslims. The Muslim heritage and religion were brought to Balkans by Ottomans, the predecessor state of the Republic. Thus, the Muslims of Balkans perceived to be more reliable citizens than the Anatolian Christians whom the Anatolian Muslims lived side by side throughout the centuries. In

hence, the founders of the Republic assumed assimilation of the Muslim immigrants would be smoother and be willing to accept the Turkish identity. Thus, the project bases itself on the religious identities and not the ethnic one.

Furthermore, Article 2 of the agreement states that:

“The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided in Article 1:

- a. The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.
- b. The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.

All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek habitants of Constantinople.

Moslems established in the region to the east frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.

(Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1924, p. 84)”

Firstly, Article 2 mentions the Muslim inhabitants of the Western Thrace instead of the ethnicity of Turkish. Therefore, the article does not imply to an ethnicity but religious affiliation. It is a well-known fact that the Muslim population of Western Thrace is diverse and composed of Greeks, Turks, Pomaces and Romas. Thus, not only the Turks but other Muslim ethnicities in the region were compelled by the compulsory exchange to be sent to Türkiye where the language and the traditions are not familiar to them.

As the same article suggests Greeks who settled in Constantinople, an exempted area of the agreement, were obliged to meet with the date criteria of 30th October 1918, the day the Armistice of Moudros signed (Grigoriadis, 2021, p.742). The article points out that not only being a resident in Istanbul but also having settled there before a certain date is mandatory in order to be exempted from the provision of exchange. Reaching an agreement between two countries has been a challenging task. Turkish delegates demanded the exchange of the Greeks of Istanbul; however, due to the fact that Turkish delegates preferred to exempt exchange of the Western Thrace Muslims, they approved exemption of Greek community in Istanbul (Kodaman, 2008, cited in Bozdalioglu, 2014, p. 17). In fact, second disagreement was over the situation of the Fener Rum¹ Patriarchate. Greek delegates supported the idea of keeping the patriarchate of Fener Rum in Istanbul while Türkiye demanded removal of it to Greece. Greece aimed to preserve the presence of Greek community in Istanbul to represent the remaining Greek community and serve the religious needs of them. Nonetheless, Greek, British and American sided with the idea of maintaining the presence of the patriarchate in Istanbul and rejected the Turkish request (Bozdalioglu, 2014, p. 18).

¹ “Rum” refers the Greek ethnicity in Türkiye. The term is often used to indicate the Greeks of Asia Minor and involves historical and cultural attribution.

Several bodies were formed consisting of the Hellenic, Turkish and neutral powers' delegates in order to conduct the migration in the most humanly scene, however, none of the bodies were concerned with the settlement of the emigrants, leaving one of the most important consequences of the population exchange to the respective governments (Blanchard, 1925, p. 451). Especially, Greece receiving higher number of influx of refugees was concerned with the accommodation, health, and integration of such a large population into the society.

The countries had two main motivations to ask for the exchange of the populations: First, both countries were economically weak after the years long wars and both countries were not ethnically homogenized which increasing wave of nationalism was causing sociopolitical problems through ethnic conflicts in internal affairs; secondly, Türkiye believed that one of the reasons why the Ottoman Empire was collapsed was due to its multiethnic structure that involved different beliefs. Türkiye believed that the communities from different religions had the support of the Great Powers of Europe which enabled them to interfere with the internal affairs of the Ottoman in order to protect the minorities. The new Republic sought out to eliminate possibility of foreign intervention through ethnic communities in the new state, therefore, nationalist elites considered population exchange as a necessity. Eventually, Lausanne Conference which had the intention of ceasing the war, population exchange occupied the large portion of the discussions. Involved parties as Türkiye and Greece but also the natural powers of the conference were satisfied with the idea.

In fact, settling of the emigrants was one of the challenging tasks to achieve for the respective governments. Even though, assigning the left behind properties to the new arrivals strikes as being an uncomplicated project, factors arise such as: inequality of the number of immigrants exchanged and the valuation of the property left behind in order to assign a corresponding property in the receiving country. More than 400,000 Muslims were exchanged in return of 1.2 million Greeks, which many of them were displaced before the formal agreement went into force (Advocate of Peace through Justice, 1926, p. 276). The disproportionality of the number of people exchanged produced other problems. The property left by the Muslims only compensated only 40 per cent of the newcomers, leaving a burden on a poor, militarily defeated country Greece (Blanchard, 1925, p. 453).

The cities were destroyed and the neighborhoods where the newcomers deemed to be installed had ruined. Nevertheless, occupation of the properties by the locals specially created the problem for the immigrants coming from the cities of Greece. As a consequence, even though the large proportion of the immigrants were from the rural areas, the immigrants from the urban areas of Greece struggled to continue their occupation in Türkiye since they shared the similar business types with the departed Greeks of Türkiye (Aktoprak, 2010, p. 20). Establishing the similar high-class businesses in a country where they had no resources was a challenging situation for many of them.

In the 1920s, Türkiye was a sparsely populated and a ravaged country, and Ankara needed the human capital of these Muslims; thus, the Kemalists welcomed Muslim immigration from the Balkans into the nation for ideological, demographic, and economic reasons (Cagatay, 2001, p.8). On the other hand, incoming Muslim population was an opportunity for a newly establishing Republic owing to the fact that the considerable proportion of the Muslims were better educated, more secular, and hardworking. Although, the Greeks of Anatolia were involved in the prestigious occupations that could revitalize the economy of a post war Türkiye, forming a bourgeoisie class from Muslim population had been the aim of the political elites. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph in a severely destroyed economy, the resources to build up the Republic were provided by the state but limited.

Apart from the distinctive outcomes of the exchange for both populations, they shared similarity in terms of being left without enough money, no dwelling and suffered condition of illness during and after the journey. The similarities both populations experienced as a consequence of the population exchange demonstrates the collective suffering that crosses the borders even though the Balkan Muslims and Anatolian Greeks have never coexisted before.

Although the thought of the population exchange to the ethnic conflicts appears to be an easy option for the political figures of both countries at the time, the expulsions proved to be nonfunctional practices in order to ensure the stability. Identifying the underlying causes and preventing them could secure a more peaceful society. The violence was the result of domestic policies and once the international community was not taken up the responsibility of the creation of the violence, expulsions were the quick resolutions (Giannakos, 2008, p. 20). In case of 20th century, war and intervention by many states in the region and territorial claims on the basis of demographic situations triggered the violence and eventually ended up with the displacement of the large number of populations (Giannakos, 2008, p. 21). It clarifies that implication of the violence in the region was not a successful tool to reduce territorial aspirations or to prevent further conflict, in fact, it contributed to the further escalation of the conflict and reproduction of problems.

In the beginning of the 1920s Ottoman Muslims from the Balkans were numerous in the new Republic. Since the turmoil started in the Balkans, Balkan Wars and afterwards, the Muslims of Balkans took the refuge in Anatolia. In order to regulate the settlements of the newcomers, Türkiye adopted its first Resettlement Law in 1926 (Cagatay, 2001, p. 8). The article stated that “those who do not share the Turkish culture will not be admitted as immigrants. Turkish culture defined by Ziya Gökalp, who was a founding father of Turkish nationalism and influenced the Kemalist ideology mentioned that there were two requirements to be eligible for an immigrant status: religion and language (ibid.). Besides those, perception of the future, the past and sharing of the Ottoman Muslim

values were other crucial elements. As Ottomans ruled in an extensive area in three continents as a theocratic state, Muslim identity was more upfront than the Turkish identity. In fact, it would have been undetectable for the founders of the new nation to define whether someone is purely Turkish or not considering the fact that there have been converts to Islam especially in the Balkans.

In Türkiye, the number of immigrants being much less than in Greece, replacement of the population in the vacant space and assimilation of the population seemed to be easier (Blanchard, 1925, p. 453). Because the departure of a larger number of minorities gave immigrants sufficient space to accommodate and initiate businesses. However, administration of the abundant properties was not properly done and claimed by those who had no right to occupy them (Blanchard, 1925, p. 453).

Additionally, the government used the newcomers to strengthen the Turkish element in the Kurdish areas of Türkiye where Kurdish are majority or ethnically diverse. The practice demonstrates that even though the nationalist elite considered Kurdish population to be assimilated easily since they were also in Muslim faith; first, even though at the time Kurdish minority had not been the concerns of the newly establishing state, Turkifying the non-Turkish areas of Türkiye was eliminating the future disputes. Second, immigrants were also a tool to Turkify the parts of Türkiye where Turkish ethnicity was not a majority.

The population exchange impacted the resettlement policies in Türkiye. Albanians who were residing in the Greek Epirus were included in the exchange which their non-Turkishness was a concern for the Turkish government (Cagatay, 2001, p. 9). Eventually, Türkiye facilitated the immigration of the Albanians to the third countries after their immigration to Türkiye (ibid.). The case of the Albanians demonstrates that the new Republic considered sense of belonging of communities when determining whether to welcome them or not. Although, this sense of belonging to the Turkish nation was more in the other Muslim migrants from Balkans, Ankara carefully considered if they were willing to assimilate while accepting the immigrant communities.

As it can be understood from the official agreements and the policies of the Republic, while rejecting chauvinism and irridentist strategies in international affairs, nation and nationalism portrayed in these official papers is based on a shared culture and identity, without any ethnic or racial discrimination at home (Güven, 2005, p. 83). However, many members of the Greek community spoke Greek as the native and they were belonging to the Greek Orthodox faith. Homogenization policies of the nationalists required Turkish language and Muslim faith to be approved ethnoculturally. Therefore, those who do not speak Turkish and not believe in Islam faith were forced to assimilate in practice even though the remaining Greek community had ensured rights through Lausanne. Although being Turkish has been determined as an ethnic identity to which everyone who

feels Turkish can be included rather than a racial expression, those who do not meet the requirements are not deemed acceptable even if they would be willing to have Turkish ethnic identity.

It is crucial to note that the narratives of victimization which is both prevalent in Greece and Türkiye created a new sense of belonging and national solidarity while forming a common enemy and a glorifying a heroic history (Shields, 2013, p. 6). The narratives are greatly prevalent that even today, and aftermath of the population exchange, the states are considering the past events and decisions in their foreign and internal affairs. However, the presence of the subjective narratives of the past to ensure the homogenized and monocultural nation-state is not eliminating the root causes of the problems, rather, the act of cutting the wound exacerbates its condition, leading to additional complications (Shields, 2013, p. 6). Furthermore, complex relationship between the two countries, Greece and Türkiye underestimated the individual experiences and memories into the narratives of the collective past and fate (Shields, 2013, p.6). Therefore, the exchange of populations has not been the last action to eliminate the multiethnic elements from Anatolia and followed by the subsequent events and expulsions in different years of the Republic that affected the individual experiences alongside the shared memories of the community.

3.4 First Years of the Republic and Insights to Anti Minority Policies

First years of the Republican era had significant impact on the regulations and laws that affected the remaining minority population. While the new state did not adopt the millet system or was form of a theocratic state, the policies were discriminative and oppressive against the non-Muslim groups. Considering the fact that the new state embraced the idea of homogenized Turkified state, ethnic minorities were danger to this type of the state and had to face the consequences of not accepting Muslim Turkish identity. Greek community, as being one of the groups that belong to the minority population of Türkiye, faced immense adversity from the early Republican legislation. After the population exchange, the new regulations were aimed to assimilate the remaining or convince them to leave showing that the new state is not their home anymore.

The government's approach to economy demonstrates the favoritism of Turkish ethnicity over the others. The government especially after the establishment of Turkish National Commerce Union, targeted Turkish businessmen to be the leading actors in finance and banking (Güven, 2005, p. 84). Most of the foreign companies had mostly minority employees. However, the government pressured these companies to employ more Turkish and due to the fact that adding Turkish employees to the companies was not profitable, the non-Muslims began to face layoffs (ibid., 85-86). Turkish language was forced to use in commercial correspondences and in workplaces which generated issues for the Greek minority who did not have Turkish as their native language. Thus, the companies who required

to know a foreign language such as French which mainly the persons from the minority population were fluent faced high pressure from the authorities to hire Turkish without meeting the language requirements of the company (ibid.). National Turkish Commercial Union was also pushing Greek merchants to leave the business and the country in order to take over the left establishments. The systematic discrimination targeted non-Muslim identities and favored the Muslims regardless of the question of merit.

A government panel banned 529 out of 960 members of the Istanbul Bar Association (Eligur, 2017, p. 12). The many of the dismissed members were from minorities and the disqualification ground was on the moral reasons, described as allying with the enemies during the invasion (ibid.). During the initial years of the country, in discourses and actions it was common to create hostility among the public and reinforce the already existing discriminatory atmosphere by reinforcing ‘Sevr syndrome’. The accusation of minority referring their alignment with foreign powers during the war years went even further, holding the next generation responsible for it and creating confusion in the society have eventually led to the almost complete extinction of the Greek population in Türkiye.

In 1926, the government threatened foreign companies of all kinds to employ at least 75 percent from the Turkish Muslims (Eligur, 2017, p. 13). Considering that most of the foreign companies' employees are made up of minorities, the threat that seventy percent of the employees is composed of Turks clearly demonstrates the big change it will create. This move paved the way for the large layoffs and employment of those who do not comply the requirements. In the table below, the percentage of Greek employees working in large companies in 1923 is given:

Table 1: *Ratio of ethnicity in the companies*

Company Name	Greek Employee Ratio	Registered Foreign/Turkish Company
Société Coopérative Desmarchands de Fromage de Constantinople	100%	Turkish
Commercial Bank of Near East	90%	Foreign
Orisdi Bank	60%	Foreign
Minorities Unies	60%	Turkish
Compagnie d'Assurances Générales d	60%	Turkish
Minoterie d'Orient	60%	Turkish
Deutsch Orientbank	50%	Foreign
Crédit Lyonnais	50%	Foreign
Banco di Roma	50%	Foreign
Banca Commerciale Italiana	50%	Foreign
Banque hollandaise pour la Méditerranée	50%	Foreign
Banque Française des Pays d'Orient	50%	Foreign
Ionian Bank	50%	Foreign
The Adriatic Petroleum	50%	Foreign
Assicurazioni Generale	50%	Foreign
Banque de Salonique	50%	Turkish

(Source: Alexandris Alexis, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations (1918-1974)* cited in Tekerek, 2019. Modified from the source.)

When the table is examined, the existence of a company consisting entirely of Greeks stands out. In the table given by Tekerek (2019), 17 of 38 Turkish and foreign companies have a ratio of Greeks fifty percent or more. It was unpleasant for the government that most of the companies were foreign companies and most of their employees were Greeks. Since minorities are seen as a tool for European powers to realize their dreams in Türkiye, trust in foreign companies was less. In 1923, representatives of the foreign companies were invited to Ankara, forming a new agreement requiring Turkish and Muslim civil servants, employees, and workers for employment (Tekerek, 2019, p.46). Indeed, in the initial years of the Republic, the state involved highly with economy aiming to increase self-dependency and breaking the power of the foreign companies in the economy.

Furthermore, the ban on the freedom of movement for non-Muslims has posed challenges for the Christian businessmen to travel other parts of the Anatolia. Until the 1930s, minorities had to obtain a special permit from the state authorities. Knowing that the issue of the permit takes long time, Christian businessmen suffered the discriminative and unequal policies in work life.

Finally, and the most significant legislation was abolishing the opportunities for the minorities to be employed in the state bureaucratic positions in 1926 (Eligur, 2017, p. 14). The legislation indicates that the minorities were not trusted in state positions due to their ethnic ties with another country, and that the new state conceived that the members of the minority could betray the state at any time. The laws of the period prove that access to the rights were restricted to certain ethnic group which unabled the persons who do not qualify with the state's perception of citizenship model to be imposed to the exclusionary practices. The discriminatory legislations of the period prove that the citizenship and the nation were distinctive categories and holding of the citizenship did not suffice the criteria to enjoy the citizenship rights.

"Citizen, speak Turkish!" has been another campaign that forced to assimilate and make ethnic minority groups publicly invisible. Turkish language not only promoted by the state authorities but also involved social actors such as student unions. The campaign was in line with the efforts on the purification of the Turkish language from Persian and Arabic words and adaptation of the Latin-based alphabet (Goalwin, 2017, p. 12). However, the campaign targeted minority population perceiving them as the agents of the foreign powers, speaking Turkish had to be mandatory in order to prove their loyalty. The campaign was one of the backstones of Turkification. Although speaking different languages was not a problem even in the multinational Ottoman Empire, it is striking that speaking different languages in a newly established and democratically governed country was an inconvenience. Distrust towards ethnic groups and efforts to create a sense of national unity were among the main reasons for this campaign.

The campaign has started in 1928 and endured until the Edirne Events in 1934. The slogans were shouted, and signs were put on to enforce the usage of Turkish by the Jewish community in Edirne. The events signified that Turkification was enforced with coercion. However, the popularity of the slogan remained intact which its presence has felt also by the Greek community in 6-7 September Events.

In the state level regulations, In 1934, Surname Law prohibited usage of the foreign surnames or any surname that represents affiliation with another nation except Turkishness and that meant endings such as -yan, -of, -ef, -vic, -ic, -is, -idis, - pulos, -aki, -zade and -bin were not allowed to be used (Güven, 2005, p. 90). In the Ottoman Empire, the people did not have surnames, but they were called along with the names of their ascendants. This law while removing any confusion regarding the name similarities but was also a sign to westernization in the country. However, the westernization has been tried to be done by bringing the Turkish identity to the forefront. It was carefully monitored to ensure that westernization did not create privileged ties between non-Muslims and westerners, as it did in the past. Surnames with different languages were not allowed in order to diminish the sense of belonging and representation of the minority identities.

The Law on Associations (Article 5-6) banned establishment of any association that promotes, protects, or develops any language and culture other than Turkish (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 2000, cited in İcduygu and Soner, 2006, p. 457). This development prevented the preservation of other languages spoken by a small number of people in Türkiye and allowed cultures to disappear.

Education has been another field where reforms aimed to assure usage of Turkish language and culture. In the Ottoman Empire, the minority groups were autonomous in the matters of educational curriculums and using Armenian, Greek or Ladino in their educational institutions. However, by the new Republic the situation for the educational institutions of minorities has altered. In the beginning of the Republic, citizens who do not speak Turkish as their mother tongue were still plentiful. First, National Education Ministry allowed Turkish teachers to teach Turkish, geography and history lessons in minority schools (Güven, 2005, p. 91). The regulation provided an opportunity for state intervention in the schools associated with the minority groups. In 1924, all educational institutions including the minority schools became affiliated with the National Education Ministry (ibid.).

The resources of the minority schools were limited, and funding has been raised through the donations of the community. However, decrease in the numbers of the community members and high salaries for the Turkish teachers further worsened the situation for the minority schools (ibid.). Moreover, first in 1927, the law on the native language of the teachers in minority schools to be

Turkish has been decided, later in 1935, Turkish was decided to be the sole language of the instruction in all schools (ibid.). The further imposition of Turkish language in minority schools for the purpose of nationalization of the education and particularly assimilation through the language led already low number of students to decrease, and hesitation to enroll these schools among the community due to the knowledge of Turkish language deficiency increased. While the total number of students in 166 Greek schools was 24,296 in 1922-23, this number decreased to 15,766 in 1923-24, 8,515 in 1925, and 5,923 three years later (Alexandris, 1992, cited in Guven, 2005, p. 91). Although the communities secured its rights to control over the community schools through Lausanne Treaty, they had little control (Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 18). The teachers are assigned by the Ministry even though the community has qualified teachers, because Türkiye sends teachers to the Turkish schools in Western Thrace, Greece, in order to maintain the status quo (ibid.). With the restrictions and the resulting decrease in the number of students, the situation of the schools worsened, and many schools were closed or on the verge of closing due to the lack of students.

Overall, Turkification of the education caused the situation of the minority schools to suffer dire circumstances that affected students, teachers, parents, buildings, textbooks and community members over the years and the policies led to abandon these schools and seek a solution in other schools and even further to abandon the country.

Business owners, employees, students, regular community members have faced with discrimination in various spaces of the public. The distrust was ensured and maintained by the legislations aimed at excluding the minority populations. Though some amendments were made throughout the years, extinction of the Greek minority in Türkiye was in near future.

3.5 Wealth Tax and Implications on the Minority Groups

In 1942, the government made a legislation that again involved a discriminatory approach directing the income of the minorities. The law was called Welfare Tax which in its original sense aimed to protect the economy from the impact of the World War II. Türkiye had not taken part in the war and decided to follow a neutral line with the powers. The country was already torn by the previous wars and the political elite had focused on rebuilding the country. Indeed, the rulers of the period exhibited attentiveness to prevent Türkiye getting involved in the war.

On the other hand, the effect of this law on the demographic change can be understood by looking at the change in the Greek population. The table below shows the change in languages spoken by minorities in 1935 and 1950:

Table 2. *Change in the population of Türkiye according to the languages spoken (1935-1950).*

Languages	Years	
	1935	1950
Turkish	13.899.073	20.947.188
Greek	108.725	89.472
Armenian	57.599	52.776
Ladino	42.607	35.786

(Source: Yakup Kalicli “Wealth Tax Implications and Its Reflections”)

The demographic change in Türkiye can be understood by looking at the number of languages spoken in these years. According to the table above, there was a decrease in the languages spoken by the minorities, Armenian, Greek and Ladino. The biggest factor of this is, certainly, those who abandoned using the minority language with the pressure to speak Turkish in these years. Moreover, the minorities started to migrate as a result of the repressive policies applied to the ethnicity's homeland and other countries. Because the year wealth tax enacted is 1942 and being the most ruthless among the other repressive policies made in these years, it can be said that the taxation practice could be the biggest factor in the population change. Thirdly, Israel's establishment in 1948 may contribute to the population decline due to Jewish immigration to the new state.

The law was aiming to extract an enormous amount of money from the individuals who had high incomes. Due to the adverse effects of the war when there was the high decline in the welfare, there was anger against large farmer and merchant groups (Zurcher, 1999, cited in Kizilkaya, 2016, p. 89). However, the amount or rate of tax to be paid by taxpayers is not specified in the text of the law. Determination of the tax amount; entrusted to local commissions composed of local government officials, representatives of municipal councils and chambers of commerce (Kizilkaya, 2016, p. 90). In practice, the unclarity on the calculation of the tax rate has caused commissions to decide on the amounts based on their own initiatives. Furthermore, the citizens were obliged to pay their taxes within 15 days and if they fail to pay with the interest within a month, they would be compelled to be dispatched to work in Askale work camps. Although on the text the law appeared to be efficient to protect the country from the economic hardship, minorities encountered the unfairness of the practice. The amount that was burdened on the individuals from the minority groups were remarkably high that even the disposal of all the belongings would not be sufficient to pay the determined amount (Güven, 2005, p. 113). Since no Turks were sent to the camps, the fact that those sent are from minority groups is an indication that this new practice is targeting the destructing the assets of the minorities.

The Directorate of Revenue and Wealth also prepared charts showing the names, addresses, occupations of wealth owners and their wealth status before and during the war (Karakoc and Civgin, 2020, p. 254). These charts were sent to Ankara, and then the persons in the charts were grouped as M (Muslim) and G (Non-Muslim) (ibid.). The classification of the persons according to the religion demonstrates that the state considers the religion of the people in the tax collection. Thus, considering the state's efforts on creating a Turkish Muslim bourgeoisie class and the dislike of the minorities, the groupings are addressing the identities of minorities instead of the wealth of the individuals.

Tragically, twenty-one people who were sent to the camps lost their lives (Kizilkaya, 2016, p. 90). The casualties display the cruelty of the practice and the work conditions in the workcamps. Therefore, the camps were criticized by showing similarity with the Nazi concentration camps. In December 1943, people who kept in the workcamps were released and in March 1944 collection of the tax was put an end (Güven, 2005, p. 117). 55 percent of the taxpayers were from Istanbul and 75 percent of the tax levied was from Istanbul (Arslan, 2015, p.134). Sükrü Saracoğlu, the prime minister of the time mentioned in his speech that 225.000.000 lira was collected as a result of the tax application (Arslan, 2015, p.134).

Feeling the devastating economic impact of a war in a newly established country and this economic impact reinforced the insecurity environment due to the fact that the minorities were able to protect their assets after two wars. Considering that minorities have more assets than Turks, even if the law is passed without a reference to ethnicity, the purpose of the practice is to destroy their assets and try to create a business environment that is Turkish and Muslim. From this perspective, those who do not see any flaws in the making of the law can see the ulterior motive behind it by observing the sad consequences after its implementation.

In conclusion, implication of the wealth tax exhibits a state centered policy to even decrease the number of minorities by imposing an unjust practice. Although, on paper it appeared to be a practice to protect the country from the effects of the war, exterminating minorities and pushing them to immigrate abroad was another unwritten aim. Thus, the secular Republic that was founded after an empire where communities received different treatments depending on the religion failed to establish an inclusive environment and equal conditions.

3.6 Transition to Multiparty System: The hope for a better future?

Türkiye declared war against Japan and Germany in 1945. The decision to be on the side of the winning powers was strategic considering Türkiye's aspiration to be included in the western world by tightening the relations. The defeat of the fascists and Türkiye's decision to join the war with the ally powers guided Türkiye to embrace more inclusive policies. However, another motivation for the

inclusive policies has been undoubtedly due to the transition to multiparty system. Having an opposition in the party system implied that Republican People's Party (CHP) which has been the only party for years and founded by the founder of Türkiye, Atatürk, had possibility to be taken down by the winning of the other party. Therefore, CHP had to revise its mistakes and come up with renewed policies in order to obtain the votes of the minorities. For instance, starting with 1946, non-Muslims with university degrees could do military service as reserve officers, The Chief Rabbinate was recognized as an official institution by the Ministry of Interior, the regulation that minority schools should be inspected by an officer from the Ministry of Interior was abolished (Güven, 2005, p. 119).

Nonetheless, non-Muslims once hoped to live in prosperity and better conditions after the empire, encountered with the brutality of the one-party rule. Thus, establishment of an alternative option revitalized the hopes for the equal treatment. Eventually, Democrat Party was established in 1946. The party had support of the minorities and won the 1950 elections by concluding the single party era.

Democrat Party lived the golden era between 1950-1954. The country benefited from the multiparty system and accelerated democratization. The positive impact of the Democrat Party rule has been noticeable by the minorities as well. Fulfilling the promises, Democrat Party moved towards liberalization of the rights for the minorities. During the forementioned years, oppressive and controlling atmosphere was replaced with a period that is more inclusive and embracing diversity. The Greek community specifically enjoyed this favorable atmosphere. The new government was very considerate about the situation of the Greek community that Democrat Party decided to open Greek Theological School in Heybeliada, allowed students from Greece and other countries to study and teachers to teach in this school (Demir, 2010, p. 38). The number of primary schools increased from 44 to 51 (Benlisoy, 2000, cited in Babaoglu, 2012, p. 16).

The Patriarchate of Istanbul had a big role in the moderate environment. Despite the fact that Patriarch Athenagoras was elected with the support of the USA in 1948, contrary to the article of the Lausanne Conference regarding the Fener Greek Patriarchate, Türkiye did not take any initiative to prevent these developments in order to maintain the positive atmosphere (Babaoglu, 2012, p. 16).

The tolerance of the new government can be explained by the speech of Patriarch on praising the Turkish nation and expressing his loyalty to the state (Lale, 2019, p. 105). In return, the Patriarch and Greek educational institutions received more autonomy. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, together with Fuat Köprülü visited Patriarchate which made Menderes as the first Prime Minister who visited Patriarchate (Akkaya, 2011, cited in Babaoglu, 2012, p. 16). In 1953, the Patriarchate was invited to the ceremony of the tomb transfer of Atatürk to Anıtkabir.

Analyzing the external relations, in the first year of Democrat Party rule, Türkiye and Greece relations were amicable. Both countries were NATO allies and members of the Balkan Pact. The fact that the Soviet anger against Türkiye was accumulating in early Cold War years and Greece was struggling with the communist guerillas who threaten the existence of the country brought two countries under the NATO umbrella (K., 1952, p. 162). Despite some tensions over Cyprus, the two countries were sincere to each other (ibid., 168). The developments between the two countries explains the reasons laying behind the developments of the rights earned by the community. However, the rapprochement between the two countries was not deemed to be enduring. The dispute over the island of Cyprus and its future reshaped the relations between the two countries in a way that the reproachment efforts that initiated in 1930s fell back into the power exercise loop over the region. In the 1950s, the situation in Cyprus was mixed. While the Turks and Greeks, the two ethnic communities living on the island, were under British rule, conflict broke out over the Greek side's demand on the island's connection to Greece. Turks, on the other hand, preferred the British rule rather than living under Greece.

The Cyprus issue not only affected the events of September 6-7 in the meandering period, but also an important factor that changed the fate of the Greek minority in Türkiye. Thus, the subsequent sub-chapter is deemed to investigate Cyprus conflict and involvement of Greece and Türkiye in the conflict in order to understand the influence of power relations between the two countries on Greek minority in Türkiye as well as on Cypriot communities.

3.7 A Painful History: Cyprus

The Cyprus has been under the rule of many empires and nations. Without a doubt the island is located on a strategic position, being a cultural hub of Mediterranean. Thus, many nations fought over the control of the island throughout the past. Although the situation changed a little over time, the turmoil on the island has never stopped.

In 19th century the island was under the rule of the Ottomans. The search for a preventive measure to stop the dying of the empire led the rulers to rely on a foreign protector. In 1878, the Ottoman Empire agreed Cyprus to be put under British rule so that island could be used to protect Ottoman Empire as a base against the Russian aspirations; however, vitality of the Suez Canal that opened in 1869 cannot be disregarded while considering the decision of Great Britain to control a strategically important island (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 39). Ethnically diverse island and the association with the motherlands of the two communities triggered the involvement of the external influence over the island and unable to form a unified Cypriot identity. In 1950s, seventy percent of the island was Greek, and thirty percent was Turkish. Due to the fact that majority of the island population was

Greek and the resemblance of the culture to that of Greece led the idea of unifying the island with motherland sparked again in 1950s. After Makarios III was elected to be the archbishop of Cyprus, the plebiscite he organized resulted ninety five percent in favor of the annexation of the island with Greece (Fouskas, 2001, p. 105-106). In 1954, after bilateral relations with United Kingdom is unsuccessful over the issue of Cyprus, Makarios decided to request the issue to be included in the UN agenda to ensure the self-determination; however, Britain opposed the idea by stating the issue is an internal problem of Britain (Sertoglu and Ozturk, 2003, p. 56). At the end, Britain took harsh legal actions such as imprisonments to stop the idea of enosis (Ismail, 1992, cited in Sertoglu and Ozturk, 2003, p. 56).

The ideas found formal grounds on organizations established by both communities. Greek Cypriots sought enosis during British administration (1878–1960) and even after Cyprus gained independence (Bishku, 1991, p. 168). Such a movement corresponded with the Megali Idea (Great Idea), a vision of a unified Greece restoring the Byzantine Empire (ibid.). The guerilla struggle for enosis organized by EOKA, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Kourvetaris, 1988, p. 188). As a reaction, Turkish Cypriots initiated their own movement called ‘taksim’ to support the partition of island between Greece and Türkiye (ibid.). When EOKA launched attacks against Turkish Cypriots the movement led formation of ‘VOLKAN’ (Coufoudakis, 1976, cited in Kaloudis, 1999, p. 11). Later, VOLKAN was replaced by TMT, which was more simple, smaller, and less organized compared to EOKA (N.C., 1959, p. 138). The clashes between the two communities and the involvement of the formally organized groups in the struggle worsened the relations between the two countries. Greece encouraged the enosis idea and viewing it as the ultimate national union while Türkiye abandoned its sovereignty over the island by Lausanne and even encouraged Turkish Cypriot emigration to mainland, its interest over the island increased and established closer ties with the secular nationalist community on the island (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 43).

On 7 June 1958, the bomb attack on the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia labeled the beginning of the intensified ethnic clashes on the island (N.C., 1959, p. 139). When the clashes intensified, the Turks called out withdrawal of the community from the predominantly Greek areas and eviction of the Greeks from Turkish areas in support of the partition (ibid.). Prior to 1958, the attacks were mainly against policemen; however, the loss of trust and discomfort led the initiation of attacks against the community members of Turkish, Brits and Greeks that are against enosis (Kourvetaris, 1988, p. 191). Standing against enosis, Turkish Cypriots changed the narrative for the division of the island after 1956 (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 44). Therefore, the idea of ‘taksim’ gained momentum.

In the situation in which one side supports enosis and the other side partition, a common ground which serves the interests of both sides had to be found. However, the issue was no doubt

more than an intercommunal conflict but a conflict which had international dimension which included Greece, Türkiye and Britain. The future of Cyprus had to be neither on the side of partition nor annexation with Greece. Therefore, the rulers of Greece Türkiye and Britain gathered to find a resolution to increasing ethnic tensions in the island. If Brits had dealt with Greek Cypriot modest demands before Turkish Cypriot nationalism became undebatable, the problem of establishing a common sense of Cypriot bicomunal community could have been doable (Camp, 1980, p. 45). Greece refused conference demand of NATO Secretary General suspecting that Britain could disrupt forthcoming appeal to the United Nations (N.C., 1959, p.145). Finally, the Greeks appealed to the UN for the fifth time but for the independence. The United States in the UN Political Committee called for a tripartite conference (ibid.). Thirty-one nations voted for the resolution and twenty-eight abstained (ibid.). Without a prior consultation with Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Zurich and London Accords were almost sure to fail. A week after Zurich talks, the plan was accepted in London by the UK Government, Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kucuk (ibid.). The highlights of the constitution of the new state can be listed as:

- The President is to be Greek and vice-president Turkish. Both having equal veto powers and being elected by their own communities (Ker-Lindsay, n.d., p. 20).
- Turkish Cypriots were given 30 percent of the ministerial posts, 30 percent of parliamentary seats, 30 percent of civil service appointments, and 40 percent of its proposed army (ibid.).
- Establishment of Treaty of Guarantee: Türkiye, Greece, and United Kingdom to be protector of the sovereignty of the island which gives right to intervene if the unity of the island is under threat. Furthermore, the constitutional changes could be carried out by the consent of the guarantor powers (Zervakis, 2004, p. 107).
- Britain's presence was assured through the military bases which consisted almost 3 percent of the island (ibid.).

Makarios became the president and Kucuk vice-president. Even though Makarios has considered independence as a preliminary stage before the annexation, the constitution of the new state demonstrates that Turkish Cypriots which constituted nearly 20 percent of the island had achieved privileges more than the proportion of their population. It was clear to see that the disproportionality of the posts given to Turkish Cypriots were unpleasant for the Greek Cypriots. Additionally, they had not achieved their maximum demand which is unification with Greece (Camp, 1980, p. 46).

Complex checks and balances imposed upon Greeks to ensure political equality with Turkish Cypriots emerged to fail the goal of preventing the conflicts between the two NATO member

countries and between the communities of the island (Zervakis, 2004, p. 108). The aim of securing the peace later failed mostly due to the Greek opposition to equal rights with Turkish counterparts on cooperation (ibid.). On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots were suspicious that their Greek compatriots abandoned the idea of enosis witnessing the speeches made for the continuation of enosis, therefore they rallied for the partition enforcing the Greek suspicions that Turks neither abandoned taksim (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 47).

Without the prior consultation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots who were the most affected, Zurich and London Accords were almost sure to fail in a few years (Camp, 1980, p. 46). Even though the Zurich-London Accords led to the establishment of a new independent state and prohibited enosis and taksim, the communities were allowed to maintain close ties with Greece and Türkiye through the symbols such as during the holidays flying the Turkish and Greek flags along with the Cypriot flag on the government buildings (Ker-Lindsay, 2015., p. 20). The lack of relations and alienation between the two communities as well as strong alignment with the motherlands failed the hopes for the peace and triggered the tensions on the island again. Although the Republic continued to live *de jure*, in practice two separate communities had *de facto* regimes in the enclaves (Trimikliniotis, 2009, p. 392). Therefore, the strict bicomunalism enforced by the constitution caused intercommunal political existence to live short.


Independence did not provide a solution to the turmoil in the island. Greek Cypriots were disappointed with the unfairness of the proportionality of posts given to their counterparts whereas Turkish were skeptical that Greeks left the idea of enosis. Two communities were compelled to live under one Republic by the decision of the motherlands. Yet, there was no effort for integration and adaptation of both communities to each other. As a consequence, the Republic did not live too long. The tensions began to increase again by the Makarios' proposal of thirteen amendments to the constitution. As the president of the island and being a Greek Cypriot, he had to either renegotiate the accords or make amendments unilaterally (Camp, 1980, p. 49). He chose to alter them unilaterally which led to the breakout of the clashes (ibid.). Some of the proposed changes includes:

- abolition of majorities in Turkish and Greek sides of legislatures,
- separate judicial system for two communities,
- elimination of separate city governments in five major towns,
- elimination of the veto power of Turkish Cypriot vice-president (ibid.)

The proposed changes meant abolition of guaranteed rights Turkish Cypriots gained. The fear boosted the tension on the Turkish side as well. Turkish Cypriots resigned from all governmental posts and started to establish armed enclaves for self-defense (Nation, 2003, p. 291). On the other side, the changes may seem in line with the idea towards enosis. However, Karamanlis was

dissatisfied with Makarios action since for him, the accords already established conditions for the enosis (Woodhouse, 1982, cited in Bishku, 1991, p. 170). The succeeding Prime Minister George Papandreou was more encouraging to Makarios and Greek Cypriots (ibid.).

Image 1: Ethnic map of Cyprus



(Source: University of Texas Libraries's Map Collection. Available at: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/cyprus_ethnic_1973.jpg)

The clashes mobilized Türkiye as the guarantor state and to protect the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Air Force bombed Greek Cypriot positions on Morphou Bay and as a result President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu criticizing Turkish side on using NATO weapons against Greek Cypriots which were handed only for defense reasons in case of an aggression occurs against Türkiye (Camp, 1980, p. 50). Eventually, the letter was persuasive to stop the mobilization of the Turkish side and prevented a ground operation for the time (ibid.). The letter affected Turkish-American relations in the following years. Above all, NATO was a significant alliance for Türkiye, and the country would not wish to be abandoned alone in a gradually polarizing world between the two superpowers.

After the clashes UN forces* intervened the island (Bishku, 1991, p. 172). When UN forces were insufficient to protect the Turkish Cypriots, Türkiye was perceiving the military intervention as the only option (ibid.). The deployment of the blue helmets, which was initially intended to last three months, is still in effect today which makes it the longest peacekeeping operation of the UN as well as a major diplomatic disaster (Zervakis, 2004, p. 112). The green line was drawn as a buffer zone. From 1963 to 1974, Turkish Cypriots lived in enclaves (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 48). Turkish Cypriots were trapped in less than 5 percent of the island. Makarios exercised power on the island excluding Turkish enclaves and created a National Guard, Grivas being the commander of the army (Bishku, 1991, p.

172). During this time, Makarios followed a policy to keep the balance between the nationalist Greek Cypriots and preventing Turkish invasion (Richmond, 1999, p. 51). Thus, in order to prevent Turkish invasion, he had to give concession to Turkish Cypriots (ibid.). He was criticized for not taking a stronger stance by the hardliners in Greece.

In 1967, the fights broke out again and Türkiye prepared for the intervention; however, after the intervention of President Johnson through envoy Cyrus Vance, the Greek government agreed to withdraw its troops in Cyprus and some officers including the head of EOKA, General Grivas to return to Greece (Bishku, 1991, p. 173). The agreement also required abolition of the National Guard, but the provision is never implemented by Makarios (ibid.). Interestingly, it was the same forces which later aimed to bring him down (ibid.). The crises of 1967 have brought Türkiye and Cyprus to the edge of war (Goktepe, 2012, p. 1412). Türkiye, in order to protect its interests and to protect the rights of the Turkish minority, Türkiye was decisive to deploy military on the island. The crisis was resolved in peace by the active policy of the US.

After 1967, negotiations started with the representatives of both communities to compromise on the constitution (Goktepe, 2012, p. 1413). The negotiations interrupted in 1971 and restarted in 1972, later extended (ibid.). During the negotiations, no progress has been made regarding the differences in the main objectives of both sides (ibid.).

In 1971, Grivas returned to Cyprus and established EOKA B which received the needed support from National Guard such as arms and officers (Bishku, 1991, p. 173). Makarios held junta in Greece responsible for the EOKA B activities and asked Greek officers to withdraw from National Guard (ibid.). Consequently, the same National Guard that he refused to abolish before, came after to overthrow him. He fled to London. While EOKA gunman Nikos Sampson becoming the president, the intercommunal clashes exacerbated. Türkiye had two options: as guarantor agreement Article 4 implies, activating the intervention mechanism or calling UN Security Council to a meeting (Goktepe, 2012, p. 1414). Türkiye, having chosen the first option, on the legitimate bases of protecting the Turkish minority started what so called by the Turks “Cyprus Peace Operation” to the island on July 19, 1974. Turkish forces encountered with the resistance of Greek Army Forces and Cypriot National Guard (Nation, 2003, p. 293). A UN-sponsored cease-fire was established on July 22. On July 24, the junta in Athens was overthrown after the Greek military forces failed to carry out Ioannides' desperate command to launch a full-scale attack on Türkiye and Karamanlis became prime minister (ibid.). Even though Karamanlis was not responsible for the Greek provocation on the island, fiasco of Ioannides' adventure paved the way for the Turkish occupation (Nation, 2003, p. 293). The military government in charge of Greece from 1973 to 1974, Dimitrios Ioannidis, pushed for Cypriots to recognize Athens as the epicenter of Hellenism (Kaloudis, 1999, p. 6). Prime Minister Karamanlis

came under fire from Andreas Papandreou for not taking a more assertive stance towards Türkiye following the invasion of Cyprus and for allowing Türkiye to conduct oil exploration in the Aegean (ibid.). Papandreou came to power in 1981 as a result of his nationalist and anti-Turkish rhetoric (ibid.).

After the calling of the Foreign Minister Callaghan, talks began in Geneva; however, when the talks entered a deadlock, Turkish forces relaunched the attacks to control the entire north of the island (Goktepe, 2012, p. 1422). The second attack has been sufficient for Türkiye to reach the inland areas of Northern Cyprus. Türkiye's second invasion of Cyprus led to 37% occupation, displacement of 250,000 Cypriots, and undermined the government's claim to protect the minority (Fouskas, 2001, p. 99).

Perception of intervention diverged for Greek and Turkish sides. Greek Cypriots saw Turkish occupation motivated with irridentist and expansionist policies rather than protecting the Turkish minority. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots saw junta's coup was the reason that they needed Türkiye for their survival (Richmond, 1999. p. 52). Furthermore, the consequences of the occupation were different for both sides. Türkiye projected to securitize itself and protecting the Cypriot Turkish to revitalize the structure on the island that is based on partnership (Goktepe, 2012, p. 1423). Even though Türkiye reached its aims, in the long run, and solved the Turkish Cypriot security issues, the extended negotiations and the inability to find a solution worked in favor of the Greek Cypriots, while the Turkish Cypriots are exposed social, political, economic, etc. areas in isolation (ibid.). Southern Cyprus represents the island as Republic of Cyprus and is a member of European Union while Northern Cyprus is an unrecognized state that its economy is dependent on Türkiye. Therefore, the illegal partition of the island and presence of Türkiye in the Northern part evolved the economic situation differently in south and north. Türkiye claims the protector status for the Turkish Cypriots and has been projecting Turkish nationalism on the island. Greece claimed the island is ethnically Hellenic dominated, culturally, and linguistically tied with Greece. Furthermore, the arrival of Hellenism on the island before the Ottomans and Turkic people was a justification for Greece to proclaim the island. Therefore, while the political situation on the island affects the cultural and social features, the two communities of the island, which are seen as completely different from each other and under the influence of the 'mainlands', became increasingly alienated from each other.

The reasons why the tensions evolved into a major conflict in the area that involves multiple actors from the outside is complex to comprehend. Greece and Türkiye could have progressed differently if they had a democratic government with democratic military and secret services (Fouskas, 2001, p. 99). However, Türkiye's military interventions demonstrated the fragility of democracy in 1960 followed by dictatorships and military coups as well as Greece also lacked

democratic rule (ibid.). The Greek junta that aimed to annex Cyprus immediately to the mainland fostered the growing Turkish aggression to capture the north of the island. Furthermore, leaving aside the prevention of war, the solutions to the divided island has not been found.

The invasion not only affecting the Greek-Turkish relations but also their relations within NATO was affected. Following the occupation Greece withdrew its forces from NATO bases on the ground that the US has not taken preventive measures against Türkiye (Papacosma, 1984, p.310). Even though in 1974 Prime Minister of Greece, Karamanlis stated that the return was unlikely for Greece decided to reintegrate due to the fear that Türkiye would advance its claims on the Aegean without the Greek presence (ibid., p.311)

Eventually, Turkish Cypriot leaders gave their country the name Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1974, implying that it was a part of a federation (De Waal, 2018, p. 51). In 1983, the leader of Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktash announced the independence of TNRC (De Waal, 2018, p. 51). The de facto state is only recognized by Türkiye and Republic of Cyprus represents the whole island internationally. On the other hand, Türkiye does not recognize Republic of Cyprus and is known as Southern Cyprus Greek Administration in Türkiye.

The consequences of the invasion have been disastrous for both communities. Perhaps, the most affected ones were the two ethnicities on the island rather than the two motherlands. Major influx of mobility between the south and northern parts of the island occurred. Following the temporary population exchange agreement signed in Vienna in 1975, 140,000 Greek Cypriots in the north moved to the south and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots in the south moved to the north (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 2). Properties were left and overtaken by the new settlers. Turkish forces expelled 170,000 Greek Cypriots from their ancestral homes in 1974, transferring their properties to Turkish authorities for military and Turkish Cypriot needs, and later to mainland settlers (Embassy of Cyprus in Vienna, 2023). Up until today, Greek Cypriots are demanding their legal properties in the north. No solutions have been accorded so far and the properties are being used and resold in the northern part. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus (2023) states that Greek Cypriots owned approximately 78 percent of the privately owned land before the invasion (ibid.). Thus, it is the de jure representative of the island, The Republic of Cyprus repeatedly expresses the illegality of the property possession in the north.

While the Republic of Cyprus is the only divided country of the EU, neither becoming a member of the union brought a solution to the divided island. Meanwhile, Türkiye being the decision-maker for the north and the northern part is highly dependent on Türkiye. Even though there have been several attempts to resolve the situation, none of them were approved. Since 1992, bi-communal and bi-zonal solutions were discussed (Duner, 1999, p. 487). However, since 1998 the idea of

confederation came upfront by the Northern Cyprus Prime Minister Denktash which is advocating two separate states rather than two communities on the island (Moran, 1998, cited in Duner, 1999, p. 488). In other words, the solution suggests for two independent states while in major decision and actions bonding them to work closer. This idea may seem also aligning with Türkiye's intention to be part of the EU while knowing it is not possible without reaching a solution for Cyprus since Türkiye is the invading power. However, it differentiates from the UN bi-zonal and bi-communal solutions while indicating a minimal form of union (Duner, 1999, p. 488).

3.8 The Pogrom in the Republic: 6-7 September 1955

The hopes raised by the community at the time of the arrival of the Democratic Party, and the deterioration of the country's interests due to the Cyprus issue, and the pressure environment created on minorities began to be felt more strongly than before. Some circles began to spread information about the Greek community's support in funding EOKA. The main channel used to disseminate the disinformation was press. The general people and press in Türkiye believed that the Rums would undoubtedly support the Greek Cypriot struggle. The hostile newspaper campaign against the Istanbul Rums and the Patriarchate grew more intense, especially throughout the summer of 1955 as the conference got near (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 375). The Ecumenical Patriarch of Phanar, Athenagoras, ended up being the campaign's most noticeable target. Athenagoras consistently refused to join this political conflict, citing the Lausanne Treaty that limited the patriarch's duties to purely ecclesiastical matters, despite intense press and public pressure to denounce Makarios and EOKA's actions and support the Turkish cause (ibid.). Due to attacks by the Turkish press, the Greek minority in Istanbul found itself in the middle of a political storm by 1954 (Sarioglu, 2017, p. 52). Student associations were one of the main actors in the escalation of the events.

With the pressure created by the nationalist campaigns launched by the press in Türkiye and some non-governmental organizations, the Democratic Party produced harsher policies on the Cyprus issue, and this tense atmosphere in Türkiye started the process leading to the 6-7 September Events (Babaoglu, 2012, p. 17). The Turkish press reported a massive massacre planned for August 28, 1955, against the Turks in Cyprus, caused anxiety, aggression, and anti-Rum sentiments among the Turkish population which unified around a national cause (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 375). The next day, Türkiye attending the London Conference with Greece and England, expressing its historical, economic, cultural ties with Cyprus and its strategic importance marked as the first time that Türkiye created a Cyprus policy, expressing satisfaction with the status quo (Aktoprak, 2010, p. 38). However, the events broke out at the time when Foreign Affairs Minister Zorlu was in London to negotiate the Cyprus question with the other parties. There were two factors that initiated the pogrom:

1) Supposedly, Greek Cypriots were preparing for an attack against the Turkish minority of Cyprus. To this situation, the editorial board of Hürriyet newspaper responded by threatening that "there are enough Greeks living in Istanbul that we can attack (Guven, 2005, p. 3-4)."

2) According to a news report of the evening newspaper called İstanbul Ekspres dated September 6, 1955, a bomb exploded in the house in Thessaloniki, where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born (ibid).

The news of the İstanbul Ekspres was made after the state run radio channel's announcement of the bombing. The aristocracy and the educated were not the target audience for these newly developing mass media. Newspapers were now accessible to people living in the lowest socioeconomic segments of society for the first time. They were extraordinarily powerful in forming a conservative and nationalist approach among the public on a number of topics (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 374).



Image 2: The heading of İstanbul Ekspres on September 6th, 1955: "Our Father's home was damaged by the bombing" (Source: 6-7 Eylül 1955'i basın nasıl gördü? Available at: <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/medya/149698-6-7-eylul-1955-i-basin-nasil-gordu>)*

The events started with the protest of the two students who were members of Cyprus is Turkish Association burning Greek newspapers in Taksim Square of Beyoğlu district. At the same time, İstanbul was hosting an international congress and protesters started to chant "Cyprus is Turkish and will always be Turkish" while walking towards the streets of Beyoğlu (Guven, 2010, 62). The houses and shops belonging to non-Muslims, especially Greeks, began to be looted (Aktoprak, 2010, p. 38). The attacks which around hundred thousand people participated continued not only in Beyoğlu and its surroundings, but also in districts far from Beyoğlu, such as Beykoz, Kadıköy and Adalar (ibid.).

It is interesting to mention that the attack tools that the participants used during the events were of the same size and color, and that the places where the attacks were carried out were marked beforehand (Lale, 2019, p.108). Moreover, attacks were conducted by organized groups of twenty to thirty individuals, which may be classified into provocateurs, leaders, and destroyers (Güven, 2011, p.4). Provocateurs carried Turkish flags, posters of Atatürk and invited more people to the riots. Leaders showed the shops, churches, schools and homes to their groups to be destroyed. Destroyers were responsible of destroying the places that were marked before or shown by the group leader with the tools given to them. The rioters were brought from Eskişehir and from outside of Istanbul by trucks (Demir, 2010, p. 44). The addresses of the Greek Cypriots were detected in advance and a member of the Cyprus is Turkish Association was waiting at the beginning of each street (ibid.). The fact that rioters had the same type of tools in their hands and that the groups acted in an organized manner reveal the fact that the events were planned in advance.

The crowds gathering rapidly, attacked the surrounding shops, houses and other immovable properties, especially those belonging to the Greeks, but without being able to distinguish whether the owners were Greeks or other minority groups, causing great financial losses at the end. Some locals informed the groups about their non-Muslim neighbors and showed them the homes of their Jewish, Armenian, and Greek neighbors. Where there was no redirection, the attackers were sent to businesses with names written in a language other than Turkish (Karayuluk, 2018, p. 41). Therefore, also other minorities of Türkiye such as Jews and Armenians and European citizens became the targets of the attacks.

The attacks were also carried out in two other big cities, Izmir and Ankara although the damage caused in those cities were relatively less compared to Istanbul. This can be understood by the fact that relatively fewer minority populations live in Izmir and especially Ankara than in Istanbul. The attackers attacked houses belonging to Greeks living in Izmir, workplaces, churches, the Greek Consulate and even the houses where Greek officers working in NATO lived (Babaoglu, 2012, p. 23).

Menderes was informed that there were unusual developments in Istanbul when the governor of Istanbul called him between 16.30 and 17.00 (Demir, 2010, p. 45). President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes returned to Ankara by train on the evening of September 6 (ibid.). Finally, with a Prime Ministry declaration, martial law was declared in Istanbul and Izmir (Lale, 2019, p. 108). The pogrom in Istanbul slowed down when military units took action at 22:00, entered Beyoğlu and took all transportation routes under control (Demir, 2010, p.45).

By the resignation of Minister of Internal Affairs Namik Gedik, Defense Minister Ethem Menderes replaced his post temporarily (Karayuluk, 2018, p. 43). Minister Fuat Köprülü was assigned

the role of Minister of Defense, temporarily (ibid.). Based on the same reasons, the Chief of National Security Services, the Governor of Izmir, the Commander of the Troops in Izmir, the Istanbul Police Chief, and three Generals were dismissed by the government and Kemal Aygun was appointed as the General Directorate of Security (ibid.).

Official statistics indicate that three people were killed, including a priest who was burned alive, as well as an undetermined number of rapes and hundreds of injuries (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 362). 10.000 buildings including shops, houses, churches, synagogues, cemeteries, schools belonging to minority communities were destroyed (Torne, 2015, p. 403). The material damage is estimated to be between 150 million - 1 billion TL, depending on the value of that day (Evrensel, 2021). The government launched a donation campaign to compensate the losses of the communities. Nevertheless, Guven (2005) mentions that a significant number of donors who participated in the donation program were motivated to contribute not with a desire to assist the damaged parties, but rather due to their sympathy for Menderes and perceiving his call for donation as a citizenship duty (Guven, 2005, p. 45). Furthermore, the amount given to the damaged persons and institutions was well below the estimated damage. The table below shows the amount corresponding the damages and the compensation paid in five Greek sites.

Table 3: *Total claims and compensation payments in five localities*

Localities	Claim (TL)	Compensation (TL)
Ayia Paraskevi	43.510,42	3.263,28
Panayia	39.758,15	2.981,86
Panayia Vlaherna	39.350,70	2.951,30
Ayios Yeoryios	33.241,91	2.493,14
Zapyon High School	7.167,59	537,60

(Source: *The Report of Consulate of Istanbul, 1956, cited in Guven, 2005*)

Taking examples in this table, it can be seen that the payment made does not even cover half of the damage caused.

A committee was established under the supervision of President Celal Bayar, consisting of Red Crescent President Rıza Çerçel, Stock Exchange and Chamber of Industry and Commerce President Üzeyir Avunduk, Yapı Kredi Bank Chairman of the Board of Directors Kâzım Taşkent and Chamber of Industry President İbrahim Esi (Guven, 2005, p. 41). Victims hesitantly applied to damage declaration due to mandatory warehouse reporting before September 6, 1955, and merchants' efforts to equalize compensation claims with tax declarations (Guven, 2005, p. 45).

It may be understandable that Menderes started this aid campaign in order not to be seen as guilty, since he supported KTC before the start of the turmoil and projected hatred in the society.

After all, Türkiye was a NATO member and deterioration of relations with America was undesirable. Therefore, it should be taken into consideration that the aid campaign have been initiated to please and not to receive backlash from the foreign countries.

Another question that arose as a result of organized attacks was which parties involved in planning the attacks. In fact, the police were not given instructions to intervene demonstrates that the interventions in the timely manners could possibly prevent such events (Güven, 2005, p. 22). Moreover, Hikmet Bil, the head of the Cyprus is Turkish Association had a meeting with Menderes on September 5, 1955 (Sarıoğlu, 2017, p. 54). Cyprus is Turkish Association had become an association by the order of Menderes (Güven, 2005, p. 57) and he had close ties with the association. The association's Istanbul and Anatolia branches were founded by the DP members.

KTC also cooperated intensively with student and youth organizations. Since the founding initiative of the association was officially based on student organizations, most of the founding members were formed from TMGT and TMTF members; TMTF president Husamettin Canozturk was also elected to the board of directors (Güven, 2005, p. 60). Moreover, journalist Kamil Onal, a member of the Board of Directors, was also a member of the National Security Services (MAH) (ibid.). During the hearings, the court disregarded the fact that Onal's collaboration with MAH persisted while he was a KTC member as well as the police reports on witness accounts that KTC operated with the government members (Güven, 2005, p. 69).

In Istanbul, martial law was first prolonged for six months (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 376). After the declaration of the martial law 45 people including the names such as Aziz Nesin and Kemal Tahir who were authors known for their left-wing support were detained as the perpetrators of the attack and KTC was shut down while its 87 members were arrested (Aktoprak, 2010, p. 39). Furthermore, investigation in Greece reveals that a student from Western Thrace gave a bomb to a Turkish consulate officer, supporting the claim that September 6/7 attacks were within the government's knowledge, similar to 1934's simultaneous attacks in distant locations (ibid.). The attacker was Oktay Engin who was from the Turkish minority of Greece and living in Thessaloniki.

In 1950s the world was highly polarizing with ideological alignment either to the United States or Soviet Union. Menderes endeavored to sustain favorable diplomatic ties with the United States during his terms. This was due to the economic and political reasons. Therefore, one of his biggest fears was enhancement of left wing in Türkiye. Considering the limited measures taken by governmental authorities to prevent the planned events, the pointing of the communist actors offered a dual advantage. Simultaneously, it enabled the interruption of the London Conference amid negotiations that were not proceeding favorably for the Turkish side.

The results of the police investigations, the processes in the Customary Administrative Court and the civil court, nor the defendants' testimonies have demonstrated any evidence that would allow the court to conclude that the defendants did not engage in criminal conduct with the intention (Güven, 2005, p. 70). Therefore, the defendants were released of all accusations (The Report of Embassy of Ankara, 1957, cited in Güven, 2005, p. 70). Mithat Perin, the editor of *Istanbul Ekspres* had close ties with DP. Perin's collaboration with MAH was revealed in a letter he wrote to MAH in 1960. In his letter, Perin (editor of the *Istanbul Ekspres*) listed the missions he had performed for the MAH and requested financial support for his newspaper *İstanbul Ekspres* (Yalcin and Yurdakul 2002, cited in Güven, 2011, p. 72).

As a result of the investigations initiated after the events, including the Cyprus is Turkish Association and the National Turkish Student Union 34 unions were decided to be shut down and their members were being arrested (Karayuluk, 2018, p. 46). Surprisingly, the court did not investigate any DP nor any MAH members. This can be related to the fact the presence of the ruling party or an intelligence organization in the events could potentially attribute the guilt on the state.

Analyzing the situation from the victim's side, contrary to the popular belief, Greeks of Istanbul opted for staying in Türkiye. The words of Athenagoras, the Patriarch of the period, "We will rebuild our home with the materials left over from the ruins" and the calls of Apoyevmatini and Embros newspapers were effective (Yedikardes, 2016). Embros included following statement on its pages:

"We will stay here, in our place. To rebuild our churches, bury our dead, tidy up our schools, workplaces and homes; The Greeks will rise from where they fell, and we will stay where we are. Where we are born, where we grow up; We will stay in this country where the graves of our grandfathers and fathers are located, 'even if they are now in ruins'. We do not remain in this country with favors and arbitrary decisions. "We are here because we have the right to stay. (ibid.)"

The main opposition party was pointing Menderes, questioning him regarding his abstention on the matter while he had prior knowledge on the breakout of the events (Demir, 2010, p. 49). Although more than a year has passed, the government's failure to make a satisfactory statement to the public has flamed suspicions and criticism towards the government by the opposition inside the party and the growing public pressure (Demir, 2010, p. 52). Prime Minister Menderes expressed his view that the harsh demonstrations were the result of "national excitement" and "national sentiments" that had been out of control as a result of the communist intention to harm democratic Türkiye (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 376). Instances like the Democratic Party's resistance to the opposition's demand,

the party that is thought to have had an impact on the events of September 6-7 for a parliamentary investigation into the events, Menderes's attempts to keep the events off the agenda, and the press censorship increased the suspicions on the DP and were presented as an anti-democratic action (Lale, 2019, p. 109). Indeed, Menderes insisted that the events were attributable to the communist actors in the country.

The 1958 elections were moved to 1957 with the desire not to allocate enough time to the opposition when high inflation and political turmoil replaced the DP's early political and economic success. The election in 1957 was an important election in terms of evaluating the perspectives of minorities on events. In fact, the minority population in Istanbul was considerably high in these years. It was important to get the votes of the minority population, whose trust and hope were broken after the events of September 6-7. Until then, the election lists included one candidate from each of the three major minority communities, in the elections of 1957 two candidates were nominated from each (Akgul, n.d., cited in Babaoglu, 2012, p. 26). Babaoglu (2012) states that the fact that DP has engaged in an intense campaign targeting non-Muslims to secure their votes in the elections can be explained by his attempt to erase the traces of the September 6/7 events, at least to some extent (Babaoglu, 2012, p. 26)

The course of events changed with the coup of May 27. After Fuat Koprulu who was the foreign affairs minister when the riots took place pointed Adnan Menderes in his speech for organizing the bomb attack in Thessaloniki (Demir, 2010, p. 49). After Koprulu's speech Greece demanded a fair trial against Menderes. President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, Foreign Minister Zorlu and Minister Koprulu were tried in the military court in Yassıada for the events of September 6, 1955, including other charges. In the case related to September 6, 1955, the above-mentioned politicians were accused of violating the fundamental rights of Greeks as Turkish citizens, guaranteed by the Constitution, and of inciting Turkish citizens to demonstrations and violence (Proceedings of the Supreme Court of Justice, cited in Guven, 2005, p. 76). In the first session, the court questioned Menderes' accusations and asked him to answer allegations such as his harsh statements regarding the Cyprus issue, encouraging the events by showing his support to KTC, Zorlu's encrypted telegram asking for a planned disorder when he was in a difficult situation at the conference in London (Supreme Court of Justice decisions, 2007, cited in Demir, 2010, p. 54). Menderes stated that his 24 August speech on Cyprus should be evaluated within the conditions of the day, considering that he received information regarding the massacre of Turkish Cypriots on 28 August, he said those words to prevent Greece and the Greek Cypriots from such a massacre attempt (Demir, 2010, p. 54). While Menderes stated that the events started as a simple student protest and escalation of it left the security forces helpless (ibid., p.55). He also admitted his close relationship with KTC and that he provided

assistance, claiming that he was considering the interests of the country at that time (ibid.). Menderes and Zorlu were held responsible for arranging the events, and eventually a "guilty" verdict was given against Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rustu Zorlu by the Yassiada court; thus, the events of September 6/7 were completely covered up (ibid., p. 60).

In her published work Güven (2005) mentions that the military court in Yassiada primarily concentrated on demonstrating solely Democrat Party members responsible for the conduct of the incidents and the trial served as legitimization tool for the 1955 and 1960 regimes rather than finding the accountable parties (Güven, 2005, p. 78). KTC's innocence was considered proven based on the previous court result (ibid.). MAH was still a part of the military organization in 1960, and the accusation of MAH would also bring about the accusation of the officers of the military regime (ibid.). Thus, the trials in Yassiada disregarded the involvement of KTC, the student associations and the intelligence service: even though, DP members and the mentioned actors were interconnected.

The events that took place on the 6-7 September can be construed as a manifestation of ongoing efforts aimed at promoting Turkification and establishing a Muslim bourgeoisie. It is noteworthy that the initial targets of destruction were, indeed, non-Muslim owned businesses. In the data regarding the destroyed buildings and workplaces in Istanbul, shops took the lead with 4025. 2474 of them belonged to Greek citizens, 722 Armenians, 479 Jews, 323 Turkish citizens, 25 Bulgarian citizens, 1 German citizen and 1 Albanian citizen (Aslan, 2020). Thus, the events can be seen as the continuation of what has not been achieved by wealth tax in 1942.

After the change in the power relations by the granted rights, equalization posed a threat to the privilege of the dominated group and triggered the violence in an attempt to the self-empowerment of the lost privileged status (Torne, 2015, p. 405). As a result of the economic crisis, the violence against the non-Muslim populations connected with wealth accumulation at the expense of the ethnically Turkish people broke out on September 6-7 (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 373). It was clear that the DP was moving towards a far more rigid and authoritarian style of government.

Once again, minority groups were shown to be responsible for the developments in foreign policy. With the escalation of the crisis regarding Cyprus, Greek citizens began to be the most affected by this issue. Unfortunately, since the Cyprus problem is not over, the fate of the Greek citizens of Türkiye has become a trump card that depends on the relationship between Türkiye, Greece, and Cyprus. The ongoing developments helped to reduce the population of this minority in Türkiye and even bring it to almost extinction. Although the events of September 6-7 were not an event that completely ended the Greek minority in Türkiye, they were a black mark that left deep traces in history and memories.

3.9 *Diminishing populations: 1964 Expulsions*

The year 1964 marked a significant turning point in the fate of the Greek community. The expulsions during the year and onwards constituted a highly efficacious initiative directed at further decreasing the numbers of Greek community. 1960s were the years that the tensions on the Cyprus island were increasing which has been the determinant in the relations between Türkiye and Greece but also policies directed at Greek community in Türkiye. The high number of migrations shaped the demographics and cultural mosaics of both countries while leaving immutable memories on the mind of individuals and the community. Although the expulsions implemented at the most strained point of the Cyprus events, I argue that the events were the result of the long-lasting ethnic, political, and historical tensions. Therefore, the events although related, cannot be diminished as the sole reason of the conflict in the island but also were result of Türkiye's efforts on homogenization policy rather than the immediate counteraction towards the Cyprus issue.

Historically speaking, Cyprus' independence from the United Kingdom in 1960 could not bring peace to the country. The idea of Enosis was alive and ethnic groups were not willing to coexist with each other. The Greeks perceived it as an unfair pact that the Turks had more rights in state affairs compared to their population. Turkish Cypriots distrusted to the Greek side; separation, and annexation of the Turkish side to Türkiye was growing stronger. Undoubtedly, independence could not bring a resolution to the island, and shortly after the independence, ethnic conflicts began to rise on the island once more. Finally, in 1963, Makarios' offer to cancel the special rights of the Turkish Cypriots in order to establish a unitary state according to the constitution was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, and after the rejection, armed conflict on the island gained momentum (Eligur, 2020, p. 6).

As a counter response, the government led by Inonu took the decision to cancel the 1930 Greece-Türkiye Agreement that allowed the citizens of both countries to live and work in the other mentioned country without restrictions. The initiative had taken in 1930 by Venizelos and Ataturk. For the time being, the agreement resembled to today's European Union Agreement.

The deportees were grouped into three categories by the officials: first, those who are expelled after the process of cancellation the agreement between March-September 1964 because of security reasons; second, those who could not return to Türkiye aftermath of the unilateral suspension of 1955 visa agreement with Greece on April 16, 1964 and third; those who were not able to renew their residence permits after September 1964 (Katsanos, 2019, p. 97). The Greeks who were expelled were diverse consisting of not only rich businessmen and industrialists but also shopkeepers, teachers, priests, craftsmen, students, housewives (Eligur, 2020, p. 13) Being a member of Elliniki Enosis Association, smuggling currency to Greece and spying for Greece were the main accusations directed

at the individuals because of the annulation of the Agreement (Cumhuriyet, 1964, cited in Eligur, 2020, p. 13).

Elliniki Enosis Association had founded in 1930s following the Turkish-Greek reproachment aimed at strengthening the solidarity and cultural empowerment among the Greek minority (Kaliber, 2019, p. 377). After sending aid during the Second World War and initiating a campaign to assist the earthquake victims on the islands, the association became idle; however, the word Enosis was associated with annexation to Greece in terms of Cyprus issue and since the 1950s, it has been a word that created discomfort in public (ibid.).

The process of expulsion was illegal, inhuman, and difficult in which the Greek citizens were taken to the local police station to be fingerprinted and photographed and were forced to sign a deportation document stating they are willing to leave Türkiye and admitting the crimes committed; for instance, being the member of the aforementioned association, assisting Greek Cypriot terrorists (Eligur, 2020, p. 13). The accused individuals were given two weeks of notice to leave the country with 20 kilograms of suitcase and maximum of 22 dollars cash (Ors, 2021). Although not all the Greeks had the citizenship of Greece, the family members with the Turkish citizens had to follow their deported relatives (ibid.)

After the 6-7 September Pogrom, the Greeks, whose trust in the Republic was already shaken and who could not see a future, but still preferred to keep the Byzantine spirit alive and stay in the lands where their ancestors lived, were suffering from the pain because of the state forced migration. Since the Cyprus problem was gaining momentum, the remaining Greeks did not want to be exposed to a second pogrom. Therefore, the community members feeling unwanted and their fate being dependent on the Greece-Türkiye relations started to leave the country even if they had the legal status to reside in Türkiye.

In 1964, Greek-Turkish citizens were about 60,000 in Türkiye and the expulsion of Greek citizens resulted in immigration of 20,000 members of the community to Greece (Eligur, 2020, p. 1-2). However, the families were formed by both Turkish citizens and Greek citizens. Therefore, the expulsions did not only affect the Greek citizens but also Greek Turkish citizens. The immigrations exacerbated during 1960s and continued in 1970s and 1980s remaining around 2000 Greeks today in Istanbul that once one third of population consisted of Greeks.

As a result of the exile of many Greeks from the country or their recent departure, there have been differences in the cultural and economic life of Istanbul. Many shops and workplaces that the Greek minority had to leave behind when they left were auctioned or were transferred to the Turks by the state, but very little of the income was transacted to the former Greek owners, while a small part was given to the patriarchate. The Greeks who remained behind had to continue their life in an

even smaller community. This situation can be understood from the situation in minority schools. Giannis Demirtzoglou, the president of the Zografion Greek High School, describes the situation of the school as the number of the students dropped by 200 after the deportations compared to the numbers of five years before the deportations (Tagle, 2021). The situation became even dire that the number of students decreased to 152 after the occupation of Cyprus in 1974 and military coup in 1980 (ibid.). Enrollment number is 47 today at Zografion High School (ibid.).

As it was before the 6-7 September pogrom, the mainstream media was also effective in the deportation of the Greeks in 1964. The mainstream media tried to reinforce the atmosphere of hatred in the public opinion by establishing connections between the Greeks in Türkiye and the Greeks in Cyprus with the increasing tension in Cyprus. In this context, the official and mainstream discourse in Türkiye during 1964-1965, associated the Greek minority of Istanbul with attacks against Turkish Cypriots that were claimed to threaten the entire Turkish nation (Kaliber, 2019, p. 2). In a stifling environment, newspapers, columnists, youth groups, and politicians targeted and nearly demonized Greeks in Istanbul who also subjected them to humiliation, economic and political exclusion, and forced exile eventually (ibid.).

There are several reasons why the Turkish government announced on 16 March 1964 that it abolished the Turkish-Greek Residence, Trade and Navigation Agreement signed in 1930 and decided to deport Greek nationals residing in Türkiye:

1) The continuation of the distrust towards minorities which has existed since the Balkan wars, and the establishment of the new Republic as a nation state and efforts to create a homogeneous nation.

2) To put the Greek minority in Türkiye under threat and to force them to pressure Greece to cut off support for Makarios.

The first reason shows that the decision that has been the product of many years is not an instant action. According to this view, Greeks have been an unwanted community in the country for years and the Cyprus issue has been seen only as a tool. Kaliber (2019) states that Greek minority was not only instrumentalized but also and most crucially the clashes in Cyprus was used to legitimize the expulsion of the minority from Türkiye by the political elites and press (Kaliber, 2019, p. 365). Even though the Republic was founded on secular foundations, minorities were tried to be harassed and migrated with various oppressive policies and laws. However, since the Greece-Türkiye population exchange in 1923, there was no record of a forced migration practice that significantly reduced the population. Legal changes have mostly been in restrictive aspects of the social, business,

and educational lives of minorities. For this reason, the Cyprus issue became the excuse for a practice that would significantly reduce the population and became the basis for gaining legitimacy for the termination of the agreement made in 1930. As a result, the Greek minority would be eliminated from Türkiye and Turkish Muslims would come to the fore in social and business life.

The second view considers events that occur in a shorter period of time. Eligur (2020) points out that in response to the Cyprus Crisis of 1964, the Turkish government adopted the theory of negative reciprocity toward Greece and expelled Greek citizens residing in Türkiye (Eligur, 2020, p. 4). While Türkiye took this decision in an effort to put pressure on Greece to negotiate with the Greek Cypriot side, the expulsions persisted notwithstanding the failure of Turkish strategy (ibid.). According to this view, Türkiye could not remain silent about the injustice and massacres committed against the Turks in Cyprus and wanted to bring Greece to the negotiation table. However, by using the Greek minority, the government would enable Türkiye to achieve its ideals in both cases. Either the Greek minority would put pressure on Greece and Türkiye would be able to bring Greece to the table, or the Greek citizen Greek minority would leave Türkiye and Türkiye would be saved from the internal threat while Greece was trying to cope with a huge wave of immigration.

It should be noted that both views are interconnected and correct. While the Cyprus issue has become an excuse for the homogeneous society that Türkiye has aimed for since its establishment, the Greek minority has become a trump card against Greece for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, Türkiye demonstrated a notable disregard for the preservation and protection of Greek minority who had significant contributions on the social and economic spheres of Türkiye in order to establish the long desired homogenized society and achieve success against an external enemy.

The complexity of the Cyprus issue not only affecting the people of Cyprus, but also the Greek minority in Türkiye showed once again its devastating consequences on the people. Certainly, 1964 expulsions have become the latest and the most impactful among all the other measures taken by the government to reduce the minority population. Different from the 1950 pogrom and allowing the clashes to demonstrate Greek minority is not welcome and safe in Türkiye, the government used the Cyprus issue as an excuse to take the expulsions as a measure for the solution of the problem. In this manner, Türkiye was able to expel the minority population further and legitimize its action in doing so. Unlike the restrictive laws that confiscate minorities from exercising certain rights and depriving from certain occupations, the abolishment of Ankara Agreement led to the major influx of Greek citizens to leave the country instead of implementing the policies to wear down the community members. Following the years of the expulsion, the remaining small number of Greeks gradually left Türkiye. 1974 Cyprus invasion of Türkiye and the strong military presence in the politics and coups of the 1970s and 1980s further contributed to the declining numbers. These years marked as the

diminishing liberties and rights for the citizens of Türkiye. The situation became even more detrimental for the minority groups as they were the targets in any threat against the state unity. Once constituting one third of the population of Istanbul, the continued immigration of Greek community afterwards to Greece and other countries left the community with around 2000 members today.

3.10 EU, Türkiye, and Cyprus

The beginning of 2000s marked with the accelerated democratization, rule of law and improvement of the human rights in Türkiye. The AKP government of the time planned significant reform packages with respect to Europe. The improvements on the conditions were made in align with Türkiye's long lasting EU accession target. Besides the domestic policy changes in the country, further improvement of the relation with other member states was essential for Türkiye's membership scheme. Being a member of the EU, Türkiye took firm steps to improve relations with Greece while supporting the resolution for the Cyprus issue. Nonetheless, efforts made by Türkiye were not enough and Türkiye chose to follow a different direction in its international politics due to the deadlock with EU. Meanwhile, Cyprus, an internally divided island managed to become a member which contributed to the further decline of the Türkiye's EU dreams.

In order to explore EU's role in the advancement of Türkiye's Europeanization first subsection will focus on the reform policies adopted by Türkiye and change of the international relations. Cyprus issue and its membership being crucial turning points in Türkiye's accession road, the second subsection will focus on the membership of Cyprus in the EU. Most importantly, both the Türkiye's EU reforms, and the membership of a divided island have affected the two communities living in Cyprus and the minority groups in Türkiye. Therefore, this section will shed a light on the interconnected developments involving the EU scheme and its effect on the relations between the states and domestic agenda.

3.10.1 The Change in the Dynamics: Türkiye and the EU

Türkiye's EU journey started in 1963 with signing of Ankara Agreement and following its entry into force in 1995. To comply with the EU Copenhagen criteria acceleration of democratization, improvements in rule of law and human rights were involved in the reform package of the new government; AKP. Particularly, 6th and 7th reform packages were focused on the freedom of expression, civilian control of military, lifting the emergency on the southeast of Türkiye, broadcasting in Kurdish, decreasing the role of National Security Council (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 60). Meanwhile, the strained relations with Greece were transforming to be more prosperous for both sides, which undeniably contributed significantly on Türkiye officially acquiring the candidate status.

3.10.1.1 Military Power

First, the military had taken a major role since the foundation of the Republic. The army was seen as the protector of the Republic and secularism. The excessive power that the military has in state affairs has led to the several coups and ultimatums. The military, taking up the role of a guardian of Republic, did not hesitate to seize power when it felt that the Republic was in danger. However, the civilization of the governance and reduction on the power of military were essential to comply with the EU criteria. In accordance with the reform package, power of National Security Council was reduced and civilian control over the military was increased through legal and financial measures (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 69).

Furthermore, State Security Council that deals with the political crimes had included one military judge in the panel which violates the European Convention of Human Rights; therefore, replaced with a civilian (Yesilada, 2002, p. 104).

The 1982 Constitution has set restrictive measures over civilians, interest groups and political parties; in spite of the constraints, the political sphere has progressed in the direction of pluralism (ibid., p. 102). Since the sign of the Customs Union there has been improvements by the amendments to the Constitution (ibid., p. 102). However, Article 8 of the law for the suppression of the terrorism continued to be obstacle for the advancement of the political reforms by making expression of Kurdish nationalism being illegal and a danger to the state's unity (ibid., p. 103). The law was effective to shut down parties that were pro-Kurdish as happened with the arrests and being sentenced to long years of imprisonment of the parliament members of HADEP (ibid.). While the reforms were removing the restriction of the Kurdish identity and language, the volume of the reforms were determined on the basis if they do not impose danger to the state.

On the other hand, the presence of the military and emergency situation in the Southeast were barriers for the progress and many of the civil and political rights violations that has taken place were connected with this issue (Yesilada, 2002, p. 103). In 2002, the state of emergency was lifted with the new government. Decrease of the military presence in the Southeast and denying the requests from military to intervene Iraq contributed the electoral success of the party in the second term and receiving votes from the southeast region even acquiring a clear victory against the independent Kurdish candidates (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 69-70) However, the closure of parties founded by the Kurds since the 1990s deprived them of political representation.

Finally, assassination of Hrant Dink, Armenian journalist of AGOS newspaper raised thoughts among the Turks that the murder was a planned 'deep state' act which was organized by the paramilitary groups which were affiliated with the high rank civilian and military officers who are oppose to the democratic reforms for Türkiye's EU accession (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 61).

Euro-skeptics in Türkiye criticizing and deterring the full implementation of the reforms, instead of the reforms that fully alter the political establishments and loosening of sovereignty through the reform concessions, they supported the option of special status or blocking the membership (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 49). The military presence in the politics and being the guard of the Republic explains the discomfort within the certain sections. Tastan (2020) in his article points out the fact that the EU accession process assisted Ruling and Justice Party (AKP) nearly being shut down in 2008 considering the fact that the party was established on the basis of political Islam and preservation of it vis-à-vis strong military presence before the reforms and defense of the secularism by it as many parties were shut down before by the military intervention in the politics due to the same reason (Tastan, 2020, p. 7).

3.10.1.2 Democracy

On Türkiye's journey to EU, conditionality rule of EU has been absent that was an essential for the EU's enlargement framework which led to the non-credible commitment to the EU and EU's lack of leverage over the volume of reforms in Türkiye (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 56). Ulusoy (2008) attributes the tensions that occurred between Türkiye and EU during 1990s to two main reasons: first, the lack of a credible EU attitude towards Türkiye reinforced the skeptical political elite to convince the public that the changes would pose danger to the secularism and nationalism in the country; second, the doubts that EU has prevented the directing strong support to the democratic spheres in Türkiye (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 21).

As a result of the non-credible approach the EU has over Türkiye has not felt the obligation to be consistent with the reforms and further democratization. Certainly, the reforms of AKP government and the steps taken before has shaped the Türkiye's new democratic system different from the one that was outdated with the weak democratic forces. The EU has been the motivation for the transformation of the political structure; however, democratization being tied to the EU membership led to the inconsistency of the progress where the doubts among the public and state elite raised that the full membership is unlikely come into being. Therefore, the accession process was a determinant for Türkiye for the adaptation of the EU norms and principles. Where the relations came to the deadlock, Türkiye withdrew and sought for a new international policy that is not directed towards the EU membership.

Nonetheless, Türkiye and EU should have been different if the EU has shown a credibility towards, Türkiye which means if Türkiye had complied with the preset goals, the EU rewards the process; thus, the relations might have been more prosperous where two sides would have met the expectations of the other side (Tastan, 2020, p. 10). EU's strategy to remove the time constraint in

the prospect of Türkiye's membership which has been an affective push for the candidate countries in the EU process, therefore losing its conditionality over Türkiye (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 60). Thus, it can be said that the democratization of Türkiye which was tied to the EU membership prospect was weakened by the lack of well-constructed incentive frameworks and the time constraint tied to that (ibid.).

Ulusoy (2008) mentions that the process of democratization took place in the years between 2002-2004 demonstrates the success of the EU conditionality through enforcement by reward and the time factor were significant factor in explaining the democratization in the domestic politics agenda. (ibid.). Indeed, Türkiye being under the pressure of meeting the requirements to set a date for the start of the negotiations EU conditionality functioned positively in the transformation of the democratic forces. However, in the period of 2004 to 2008 the weakened EU conditionality and the adverse outcomes from the Cyprus issue resulted in EU's change in the strategy towards Türkiye, idea of a 'privileged partnership' and the long-lasting negotiations were detrimental for the democratization process (ibid.). As a foreign policy impact of the conditionality on Turkish foreign policy together with the accession of Cyprus and the gradual end of Türkiye's EU aspirations related to the outcome will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs

Türkiye, while making progress for the EU values and norms in the first period before the negotiations start, the second period embarked the slow process and the lack of conditionality leading only opening of the 16 chapters out of 35 up to the current date and only one had been managed to be closed.

3.10.1.3 Human Rights

Clearly most glaring problem for the EU has been the treatment of minorities in Türkiye. Although there has been some progress made, the cultural rights of the Muslim minorities were being undermined. Especially the Kurds, composing a large population in Türkiye, mainly in the Southeast, has been the concern of Europe. Likewise, the Lausanne recognized minorities faced in the beginning of the Republic, restriction of exercise of cultural rights such as use of the language in public, media and education had also started to become problematic for them. Considering EU's primary concern Türkiye has taken some steps regarding the provision of the rights, besides the Kurds, Christian minorities even today facing the difficulties. Greek minority has been one of them especially regarding the education and property rights (Türkiye 2009 Progress Report, 2009, cited in Hughes, 2010, p. 576)

Primarily, the minority rights were defined by the bilateral agreements and covenants. However, the EU associates democracy and minority rights. In this logic if the democracy is stable

and strong, there poses minimum issues for the EU (Eralp, 2010, p. 3). Therefore, the EU reinforces the advancement of minority rights on the candidate countries (ibid.). Furthermore, the EU utilized frameworks of universal documents, new treaties and provisions of OSCE (Toktas and Aras, 2009, p. 706). Indeed, Türkiye not being a signatory country to the Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities and European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages has been a problem. The commission also makes references to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Türkiye's persistence on keeping the minority regime in the line with the Lausanne Agreement comes from the fear that the assurance of such rights to different ethnic groups might present threat to the unitary characteristic of the state and trigger the separatist movements. It can be observed that the Türkiye's past view of the Greek minority as a threat and a source of suspicion also applied to other groups demanding their rights, which later became a problem for Türkiye. Kurds were not able to benefit from their collective rights by the minority regime, which also affected the Greek minority and still is not changed.

It was mentioned in the EU progress reports that Türkiye is not willing to recognize any other minority group which was not mentioned at Lausanne is not an obstacle to ensure the cultural, linguistics, and religious rights to the demanding groups (Yazgan, 2015, p.108). In order to meet with the EU criteria Türkiye took partly effective steps. The Press Law enabled the broadcasting in different ethnic languages. The broadcasting in other local languages and dialects was authorized and teaching of the ethnic languages in the schools were allowed as the elective courses. However, unlike the recognized minorities EU process did not bring education rights in other ethnic languages, establishment of the schools dedicated to the specific minority groups. Moreover, the education system reflecting the Sunnite primacy was criticized heavily by Alevite groups. There has been taken some steps such as adapting the curriculum of the religious culture and moral knowledge lessons to be more inclusive, mentioning the Alevite religious practices.

In terms of the improvements on the rights of the non-Muslim minorities a new constitutional amendment in 2002 enabled foundations run by the non-Muslim minorities were permitted to possess and dismiss the properties (Toktas and Aras, 2009, 703). Minority foundations in the period of 1970s to 2002 maintained their status as established by 1936 Declaration; however, could not acquire real estate (Alkan, 2009, p. 101). The dispute between the entities and the state were carried to the judiciary (ibid.). Finally, the law adapted in 2002 enabled the removal of the obstacles on acquiring movable or immovable properties and equalized with the foundations established by the Turks (ibid.). Another law passed to allow the use of electricity and water free of charge likewise the mosques (Toktas and Aras, 2009, p. 712). However, the immovable properties required restoration after long years of abandonment. The limited resources available for the restoration of the buildings contributes

the financial challenges faced such as the Buyukada Orphanage which is the biggest wooden structure of Türkiye demands an extensive monetary asset. Neither the minority foundations nor the Ecumenical Patriarchate having such resources, the restoration of the immovable assets relies on the Greek diaspora or Greece (Grigoriadis, 2021, p. 749).

The AKP era was a period in which some rights were regained for the Greek minority. Some improvements were observed during the initial years of the AKP administration. There was a desecuritization of the minority policies along with the decline in role of the military (Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 21). Although, the democratic backsliding occurred after the third term of the party, the Greeks have not experienced a major change in their status (Grigoriadis, 2021, p. 246). This can be related to the fact that Türkiye began to face new minority problems. Greek minority seemed more compatible with the vision of the AKP (Grigoriadis, 2021, p. 746). Considering the historical locality of the Greek minority, AKP government have not perceived the group as an inside enemy nor acted with the Sevr Syndrome. The Kurdish minority has become the new target regarding such accusations, and anti-minority rhetoric and phobic response was directed towards the Kurds (Grigoriadis, 2021, p. 746). It is significant to note that the restoration of the non-Muslim worship places which has been done during the AKP era were not addressed to the Copenhagen Criteria nor the Turkish constitution but referred to the Ottoman past of the country in which the minority regime was based on the ‘millet system’ (Grigoriadis, 2021, p. 248).

The problems persist for the foundations on the issues such as modifications on the religious buildings require a not easy to get process (Pope, 2005, p. 100). On the other hand, incidents such as mobs organized against the Greek Orthodox Patriarch demonstrates the public level of the issue endures with regards to the prejudice and hostility to the non-Muslim minorities.

The other challenge is in connection with the status of the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox who was recognized as the ecumenical leader of the Eastern Orthodox faith followers, mainly Russians, in the world except Türkiye denies granting him this status with the aim of not giving the Greek minority any advantage in the domestic (Pope, 2005, p. 100). The issue is related with the nonrecognition of the patriarchate on the Lausanne Treaty and its failure to mention the status and the protection of the Patriarchate (Grigoriadis, 2008, p.16)

Another obstacle has been on the selection of the ecumenical leader. The election of the patriarch requires the approval of the Turkish authorities, and it is required that the Patriarch is a Turkish citizen (Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 16)

Heybeliada Theological School continues to be the challenge until the present day. In 1950 with the orders of the Ministry of Education the school became a higher education institute and was allowed to enroll foreign students (Yalcin, 2013, p. 109). However, in 1971 the cancellation of the

related articles on the private educational institutes led to the closure of the school permanently (Oktay, 2021). The opening of the school has been expressed multiple times by the AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan on a few occasions. However, he demanded the reciprocity of the similar act to be done by Greece with regards to opening of a mosque in Athens.

Türkiye and Greece have been criticized by the Parliamentary of Assembly of Council of Europe on the ground that the utilization of the ‘reciprocity’ by the politicians and officials as a reason to suspend the potential reform packages (Karaosmanoglu, 2010, p. 203). Considering the cruciality of the equality, human rights, and freedom; the reciprocity does not possess a valid argument (ibid.). In fact, the Greek-Turkish relations once again affected the domestic politics. Additionally, instead of making progress on the accession process, Türkiye risks changing its domestic policy towards the Greek minority, influenced by strained relations with Greece. Nonetheless, Grigoriadis (2021) mentions that the effect of the Greek- Turkish relations on the Greek minority has declined together with the small number of populations remaining (Grigoriadis, 2021, 777).

The AKP administration also has taken progressive steps regarding the Greek minority in Gökçeada (Imbros) Bozcaada (Tenedos). The locals of the island were mostly the Greeks and were deported after the cancellation of their citizenship in 1964. The warming relations of the Greek-Turkish relations initiated the Greek resettlement to the island. Subsequent generations regularly visiting their ancestral lands and settling led to the increase of the Greek population on the island. Moreover, the growing population led to the reopening of the primary and secondary schools (Gultekin, 2013). It should be noted that the opening of the schools date back to the year of 2015, the period when the AKP administration abandoned their strong goal of joining the EU.

However, it can be asserted that openings that EU process brought maintains its effect on the policies and in fact, the grant of the rights to a small number of minority population do not possess harm against the unity of the state. The grant of the right was still depended on the relations between Greece and Türkiye.

3.10.1.4 Europeanization of the international relations: Türkiye, on the EU path

The transformations of the AKP governments have also impacted its foreign policy through the normalization of the relations with the neighbor states who are perceived as potential external threats such as Syria, Iraq, Armenia, Greece, Bulgaria, Russia, Iran and has taken progressive steps towards the resolution of the Cyprus issue, broadly, making Türkiye as stabile actor in the region reflect the democratization in the foreign policy agenda of Türkiye (Pericleous, 2011, p. 3).

Relations with Greece and Cyprus issue connected to it were determinants for Türkiye's membership. After the long tense years on the ethnic conflict in Cyprus, 1990s marked with the tension between Türkiye and EU affecting its relations with Greece.

In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali initiated a diplomatic approach to the Cyprus issue with 'Set of Ideas' (Nation, 2003, p. 300). However, the dialogue between The President of Cyprus Georgios Vassilou and unrecognized TRNC President Denktash due to the latter's insistence on the prior recognition of TRNC to start the negotiations (ibid.) However, it can be asserted that the framework initiated by 'The Set Ideas' can be resembled to the prior conceptualization of the Annan Plan.

In 1995, Greece demanded accession negotiations to start for Cyprus in exchange of supporting the Customs Union Agreement with Türkiye tied to the fact that exhaustion from the Turkish Cypriot attitude (Nation, 2003, p. 301). Yet, same year in December, the tensions came near the edge of a close combat due to the small islet located between Bodrum and the Greek island Kos (Nation, 2003, p. 303). When a Turkish freighter hit to the small rocky islet, the Greek authorities assisted in rescuing the personnel (ibid.); however, Greek side declaring sovereignty over the rocky islets started the dog fight between the two countries. The incident became a starting point for the disputes over the territorial water of the Aegean Sea.

The second tension for Türkiye came with the non-inclusion of Türkiye on the list of the candidate countries in Luxembourg Summit of 1997 where the candidate status was attributed to the countries such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania (Yesilada, 2002, p. 95). The decision of the Summit generated frustration for Türkiye.

Türkiye has reacted with outrage by the start of the negotiations with Cyprus. The fact that the start of the negotiations with the Greek Cypriots without the consideration of the Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye increased the strained relations (Kilickiran, 1998, p. 114). This development led Türkiye to further state to put integration with TRNC in the top of the agenda (ibid.). Although, some parliamentarians criticized the decision and expecting the escalation of tensions without the concrete solution, the start of the negotiations and the statements of Türkiye altered the ambiance of the Parliament (ibid.). Formerly, Türkiye had objected the application of the membership to the union by the Greek Cypriots in 1990 stating the unilateral application is not valid based on the international treaties of 1959-60 unless the Cyprus's status is addressed (Zervakis, 2004, p.116).

Tannam (2012) asserts that the change in the attitude of EU was due to the decision of resolving the Cyprus issue separate from the Cyprus and Turkish accession negotiations (Tannam, 2012, p. 64). The change in the attitude was the result of unlikeliness of Turkish membership if Cyprus

issue is being retained tied to the Turkish and Cypriot accession (ibid.). Unlike the author suggests, Türkiye's perception on the decision was diverging from being beneficial for its membership.

Another tension was due to the PKK leader Ocalan seeking asylum from Greece and Türkiye's demands to hand him over to Türkiye. Following the Turkish threats Greece agreed for the expulsion of Ocalan and suspension of further support for PKK (Nation, 2003, p. 306). Turkish forces detained him while under the escorting of the Greek authorities from Nairobi, Kenya after he was denied of asylum from Russia, Greece, and Italy (ibid.). The handover of the leader of PKK by Greece has softened the strained relations between the two countries.

Arguably, the event that marked the turning point of the relations at the time was the massive earthquake hit in Izmit, Türkiye, the city that is near Istanbul and causing a loss and great damage for the residents and surroundings in 1999. Greek Special Disaster Unit immediately assisted the rescue operation being one of the most effective on the field paved a way for the 'earthquake diplomacy' (Nation, 2003, p. 307). The earthquake in Türkiye followed by an earthquake in Greece and Türkiye sending rescue teams created a sphere for the seizing the tension and utilizing this chance for the production of improved relations through the areas of tourism, trade, drug trafficking (Yesilada, 2002, p. 97) and even a cooperation on military exercise over Aegean (Nation, 2003, p. 308). Greece was one of the main obstacles for Türkiye's candidacy. Together with the change of climate between the two countries, EU and US initiated a dialogue on the Greek veto for Turkish candidacy and diverse Greek-Turkish issues (ibid.). In fact, Greece preferred a democratic Türkiye that is under the Europeanization pressures which enables to form a stable and cooperative neighbor that disputes can be resolved through peaceful negotiations (Ifantis, 2018, p.101).

In 1999, the EU finally accepted Türkiye as a member state on the basis of the criteria meeting with the EU's *acquis* before the start of the accession talks; although this attitude created discomfort among the Turks on the grounds that no other candidate country was required to meet the *acquis* prior the start if the talks (Yesilada, 2002, p. 98). However, the ease of the Greek veto and the raising hopes for the membership led Türkiye to agree on the EU's statement to meet *acquis*, resolve the Cyprus issue working with Greece acknowledging the revision of the EU on the stated fronts in 2004 (ibid., p. 99). The removal of the Greek veto for the membership was the second turning stone of the Greek-Turkish relations as removal of veto on customs union being the first in 1996 (Grigoriadis, 2003, p. 4). However, in return of the Turkish candidacy to the EU, the Greek parliamentarians and politicians stated that Greece would block the enlargement process unless Cyprus is admitted in the EU regardless of the referendum results (Barkey and Gordon, 2001, p. 86). On the other hand, Greece bearing the cost of constantly blocking the EU process for Türkiye would draw a negative image of Greece in terms of harming EU interests and focusing on its own national interests (Grigoriadis, 2003,

p. 4). In the beginning of 2000s Greece was a supporter of the Türkiye's accession process, even demanding the reconsideration of Türkiye's compliance with Copenhagen Criteria within 2003 so that the talks could start in 2004 (ibid.).

The EU introduced its guide to Türkiye to accomplish the *acquis* and Türkiye prepared the National Program in response to the guide in the scheme of Accession Partnership Agreement (Tocci, 2010, p. 100). The National Program explained the roadmap of how Türkiye aimed to meet *acquis*. However, human rights issues and minority rights being one of the primary concerns of the EU did not allocate enough space on the Program.

Rauf Denktash who was the president of the TRNC was inflexible on his demand that the any resolution regarding the island should be based on the recognition of the island while being reluctant to engage in a compromise. However, this rigid attitude has changed by the election of the Justice and Development Party in Türkiye.

On November 3, 2002, Justice and Development Party (AKP) founded by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul managed to get 34 percent of the popular vote and 363 out of 550 seats in the parliament, a party which represented the political Islam phenomenon (Nation, 2003, p. 314). According to Nation (2003) unlike the previous Islamic oriented Welfare and Justice Parties which announced their Islamic character to challenge the secular amendments and adjustments, AKP minimized its openly declared Islamic orientation and supported the democratic institutions and secular character of the state (ibid.). Considering the political orientation of the party and the aim of becoming a member had also perspective to prove that a country that is formed majorly by Muslims could also be part of Europe. Even though Türkiye shared a diverging history from the European countries and perceived as an occupier force of the European countries in the name of Islam historically, integration of a such country could revitalize the hopes that Islam and European values are not conflictual, and membership of Türkiye is a demonstration of the statement despite the hardliner's opposition.

Being dependent on the resolution of the Cyprus issue for the membership prospect, the new government of Türkiye pushed Denktash to be moderate for the resolution of the issue. Notwithstanding the demand of the EU from Türkiye to support the resolution, but also membership of a unified island to the EU would increase the possibility of Türkiye to become a member. On the other hand, suffering the consequences of isolation from the rest of the world and being dependent on Türkiye had major economical detriment for the young generation in tNorth Cyprus who were struggling with unemployment and high inflation.

The resolution plan was put forward by Kofi Annan who was the UN Secretary General at the time. The new round of talks on the resolution of island started in 1999. The final revised version of

Annan Plan foresees a state alike in Switzerland with a federal government with rotating presidency and two constituting states with unified international recognition (Atasoy, 2003, p. 258). Furthermore, the Plan was requiring the return of the 20 percent of land from North Cyprus to the Greek federal state while Turkish side would decrease to 7 percent of the island (ibid.). The plan had objective to allow the return of Greek Cypriots to their lost properties or to compensate them (ibid.).

While Türkiye had its support over the Annan Plan and unification of the island under the single entity, in the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, the EU announced the completion of the talks with Republic of Cyprus for the accession to the EU (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 64). Although EU stated its preference for the accession of Cyprus as a unified state, the decision has brought the issue to a deadlock. The Council recommended both communities to reach an agreement for the resolution. However, the recommendation of support to the Plan was not binding and not reflecting the EU conditionality.

Kyris (2013) describes the position of the Republic of Cyprus as a gain of diplomatic power over the issue. Indeed, the prospect of membership without the conditionality of unification, Greek Cypriots lost their interest on the resolution and concentrated on the idea of integration with the EU. In this context, in April 2004, the Annan Plan was rejected by 75 percent short after Cyprus became a member (Kyris, 2013, p. 7). the Greek Cypriot President stated in his speech at the General Assembly of the UN in 2004:

“Firstly, the Annan Plan was not the product of negotiation, nor did it constitute an agreed solution between the parties. Secondly, the Plan did not place the necessary emphasis on achieving a one State solution with a central government able to guarantee the single sovereign character of Cyprus. Thirdly, it failed to address the serious concerns of the Greek Cypriot Community regarding their security and effective implementation of the Plan. (Papadopoulos, 2004)”

He listed his concerns as the proposal not being effective for the resolution of the divided island by stating the plan was drafted without the productive constellation between the parties, the distrust on the plan to establish a single centralized governance and the safety issues for the Greek Cypriots in the process of the return of the properties.

While Türkiye was changing its strong hard line foreign policy on Cyprus and softening its view with the goal of joining the EU, the Greek Cypriots realizing the integration with EU could be possible without the unification, moved to a different direction. Certainly, the Cyprus issue and EU leverage on Türkiye to condition the Turkish integration with the support to the Plan, led changes also in the domestic politics and the reforms Europeanized the Turkish policy.

Finally, the referendum was held in April 2004 and voted in favor by the Turkish Cypriots; however, the Greek Cypriots following the president's direction with the guarantee of the membership rejected the Plan. One month after following the rejection of the plan, Cyprus acceded EU. In spite of the opposition of Denktash; the support of the AKP government and the willingness of the people of North Cyprus, the reunification has been unsuccessful.

Following the failed plan, Türkiye's Cyprus policy started to shift towards the traditional line and the accession impacted EU-Türkiye relations negatively. One example of the deteriorated relations was based on the Additional Protocol which foreseen the implementation of the Customs Union to all member states including Cyprus (Ulusuooy, 2008, p. 65). Türkiye emphasizing the extension does not imply the recognition of the divided island while EU highlighting the importance of the recognition for the accession process brought the relations to stagnation (ibid.) despite the start of the talks in 2005. However, the refusal was also due to the Commission's proposal to allow the direct trade between the EU and North Cyprus in order to lift the isolation of North Cyprus was vetoed by Cyprus once in the EU (Tocci, 2010, p. 30).

On October 3, 2005 the negotiations started for the full membership; however the change of the leaders in Europe, Angela Merkel becoming the chancellor of Germany whom she and her Christian Democrat Party strongly opposed to Türkiye's full membership; 2 years later Nicolas Sarkozy becoming the president of France who was against the membership of Türkiye doubling with the membership of Cyprus, opposition to Türkiye's membership became more expressive and prevailing (Tastan, 2020, p. 7). Reflecting on this, the change of the leaders in Europe has been another factor that affected Türkiye's backsliding in the EU process as well as its Cyprus policy. In response to the changing atmosphere within the EU, Türkiye's yet lagging behind in the human rights, turbulent relations with the EU states and increasing democratic issues led different ideas to be put forward as an alternative to membership. One of these ideas was put forward by Chancellor Angela Merkel. The privileged partnership could be an option for Türkiye. The complex interdependence between Türkiye and the EU makes even any form of partnership unlikely to sustain. Türkiye-EU relations seems most likely to be successful on the areas such as, trade and energy, security, foreign policy and defense and migration (Tastan, 2020, p. 9). However, the success of the cooperation between the parties most likely depends on the mutual gain and the firm accession negotiations could lead to a greater success in the prospected areas.

Tastan (2020) further states that the from 2007, the EU accession process started to serve the legitimacy of AKP considering its roots in political Islam and to provide a security for itself vis-à-vis old military dominated establishment (Tastan, 2020, p. 7). Thus, the start of the talks did not have an impact to Türkiye's policies and the determination of Türkiye to be able to close the chapters. Indeed,

in 2006, the EU decided to suspend eight chapters of the accession negotiations due to the strained relations and Türkiye did not take any bold steps since then.

The AKP government needed to be rewarded for its stance on the Cyprus issue. When the government did not see any positive result of its Cypriot policy, declined its interest to follow the line required by the EU. During its support for the Annan Plan, the party was already dealing with the nationalist and populist backlash. After the rejection of the plan and down warding EU relations, AKP repositioned itself by considering the opposition demands. The failure of the policy also led to the prestige loss and internal conflict within the party (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 67). The unsuccessfulness of the policy had adverse effects on the democracy and internal policies in Türkiye. The party has strengthened its follow of the political Islam ideology. Furthermore, the human rights issues and freedom of speech became serious issues. As Pericleous (2011) states that a solution on the Cyprus issue would unblock the frozen negotiation chapters and settle the enduring disputes with Greece and forming a peaceful, cooperative and stable sphere between Greece, Cyprus and Türkiye (Pericleous, 2011, p. 6) which could be a big accomplishment for the countries involved and the EU.

The EU has been the goal for Türkiye since the idea of a European community was align with the westernization principles of the Republic since its foundation. However, the modernization and secularism protected by the military; on the contrary authorities and governments perceived to be its enemy instead of the protector had implications on the democratic advancement of the country as well. The break of the military power was not only crucial for the domestic politics, but also for the foreign affairs especially the military control over the Cyprus issue was visible. Thawing of the relations with Greece became essential in order to be able to become a candidate for the EU which required the lift of the Greek veto that has been an obstacle. In the same context, Türkiye had to resolve the Cyprus dispute and take part in the peace process. The foreseen unification of the island and normalization of the relations along with the resolution could be two remarkable external achievements Türkiye could acquire to ensure its future membership. However, there was still a remaining sphere that even the National Program that was prepared to meet the *acquis* of the EU was not sufficiently addressing the minority rights issues. The advancement of Türkiye on the EU path and backsliding had certainly effects on the minorities. The long-endured minority issue of Türkiye has received a demand for the expansion of the rights to the other identified communities. The continues problems that Lausanne Agreement recognized minorities faced has extended to the other minorities who demanded their communal rights behind the individual ones. Kurds being the main group which demands their communal rights has been challenged by Türkiye and the EU process provided secured rights to them; however, it is far yet to achieve the expected output. On the other hand, uninsured rights of the officially recognized minorities led to a nonending process of

negotiations. Greek minority being associated with Greece had improvements in their rights with the betterment of relations with Greece. Türkiye opted for a different destination for its future rather than the EU, being a regional power in between of Asia, Balkans and Africa tries to assert its power in the surrounding areas. However, the reform processes started with the AKP administration of early 2000s, although led to a decline and issues on freedom and rights, non-Muslim minorities gained a greater sphere for their autonomy and rights.

3.10.2 Membership of a Divided Island: Cyprus

The accession of Cyprus has been the turning point both for the Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye's future in the EU. The consequences of the accession were diverse for the parties. Türkiye has entered a deadlock in its EU process, Turkish Cypriots continue their isolation, Greek Cypriots receive the benefits of joining the Union economically and politically. The internalization of the divided island's problems paved a way for the membership of the island while leaving Türkiye on the limbo regarding the application of conditionality of the EU.

Cyprus as an island in the Eastern Mediterranean shared a rich history and a culture. Cyprus, an island that has been home to many civilizations, was in turmoil as it struggled to gain independence from the Brits. The independence from the Brits did not bring peace to the island with the demands of the Greek and Turkish communities and their proximity to their motherland Greece and Türkiye. The escalation of the conflict from 1950s to the occupation of the island in 1974 diverging two communities lived in the same island separately. The Greek side of the island as Republic of Cyprus is an internationally recognized state while the Turkish North Cyprus is struggling with the isolation it faces as a consequence of non-recognition and dependency on Türkiye. Enjoying the formal recognition of the entity, Republic of Cyprus has developed itself economically that the country enjoyed a high GDP in respect to its size and population. On the other hand, the inhabitants of the Republic of Cyprus were Greeks which shared a common history with Europe and influenced by the European culture and values. The further improvement of the country required further integration with the EU. Considering Greece was already in the EU, the membership of Cyprus would strengthen the economic relations with Greece and other EU countries.

Towards the end of 1980s The Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with the Customs Union and began to endeavor the full membership to the EU (Zervakis, 2004, p. 116). Besides the economical aspect, the political aspect of resolving the Cyprus issue within EU was initially a motivation (ibid.). However, the aspect faded away short after because of the Greek Cypriots fear of being put under any burden to compromise with Turkish Cypriots (ibid.). In 1999, Helsinki European Council declared that the reunification of the island was not required for the accession and regardless of the

decision of the Cypriots, the Republic of Cyprus would become a member (Atasoy, 2003, p. 259). The decision was met with disappointment by Northern Cypriots. Türkiye has begun to question the EU's credibility, knowing that the decision would affect its EU process.

Tannam (2012) in his published work compares the Cyprus case to the Northern Ireland. For example, the EU aid programs targeting Northern Ireland required intense cooperation of British and Irish sides (Tannam, 2012, p. 56-57). Moreover, the EU provided a decision-making model for the Irish-British relations and resolution of the Northern Ireland issue. However, for the case of Cyprus, Turkish-Greek cooperation was short-lived and lacking a guideline model. Thus, it can be referred that while British- Irish cooperation was more cooperative and change in the narratives was seen. As a result, both countries and communities can coexist nowadays.

The economic dependency to Türkiye has affected Turkish Cypriots adversely. Türkiye coping with the financial crisis of 1990s and in the same years the advancement of Cyprus in the EU process and successfully proceeding in the negotiations have detached the Turkish Cypriots from Türkiye and the idea of reunification has become stronger especially in the younger generations who experience high inflation and unemployment. The economic situation was easier for Türkiye to tackle compared to the isolated North Cyprus. Therefore, the support to the Annan Plan was high among the Turkish Cypriots. Even though, the President of TRNC, Rauf Denktash, was inflexible in his demand of any resolution to be based on the sovereign recognition of TRNC, the public opinion was contrary. As a response to the diverse opinion between the public and the president, interestingly the checkpoints were opened one year prior to the Annan Plan. Bryant (2009) describes the reason as the Turkish Cypriot officials were hoping to restart the intercommunal clashes on the island (Bryant, 2009, p. 4), thus failing the plan before the referendum. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of Turkish people supported Denktash and his defense to protect the TRNC national identity connecting it with the foundation of a state that hardly won liberation movement against the Greek invasion (Atasoy, 2003, p. 263).

The principle of conditionality is one of the tools that leads to a great transformation on the policies of the candidate states. In the case of Türkiye, the EU conditionality functioned with regards to the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Indeed, even the hard policies of Türkiye were transformed with the conditionality. However, the Greek Cypriots were detached with the reunification idea due to the lack of conditionality. This led to the rejection of the plan and accession of a divided state to the EU membership short after.

The rejection brought different consequences to the parties. Türkiye left its EU focused flexible EU possibility and returned to the hardline. Especially considering the contemporary gas research in the Eastern Mediterranean, North Cyprus possesses strategic importance to Türkiye. By

the strengthening of the inflexible view on Cyprus by the Turkish authorities and government, Turkish public opinion became more nationalist on the issue. Turkish Cypriots received Republic of Cyprus citizenship aftermath of the accession. Thus, they can benefit from the EU regulations such as the free movement of the persons to live and work in any member state. However, due to the nature of being from an unrecognized state, North Cypriots face difficulties in bureaucracy regarding the documents collected from TRNC while Republic of Cyprus cannot issue all types of governmental documents to the Turkish Cypriots. Finally, the Greek Cypriots live in an internally divided island, receive the full benefits of being from an EU state in correlation with the rising economy and development of the South Cyprus. In fact, the country has been highly attractive to the foreign investors and tourism is a big source of income.

Furthermore, in the public level, the solution to the island became more individualized than finding a single solution to the problem (Bryant, 2009, p.4). The Greek Cypriots who have the property or compensation demands, business interests or emotional unfinished business-all the individuals with the problems that are the result of the divided island, try to find their own solution (ibid.).

It should be noted that Republic of Cyprus is an internationally recognized state while TRNC represents the illegally occupied unrecognized state. Therefore, it would have been unacceptable for the EU to block the membership of a state that has the intensified relations with the EU as opposed to a non-EU member Türkiye and the illegal state TRNC (Vilotti, 2012, p. 32).

The decision had serious implications on the island. The EU Commission proposed two regulations for the development of the North Cyprus aftermath of the rejection: Direct Trade regulation and Financial Aid Regulation (Kyriss, 2013, p. 10). Although the Financial Aid Regulation was finally adopted in 2006, Direct Trade Regulation is still on hold, due to the Greek Cypriot rejections claiming the implementation of such regulation means recognition of the North Cypriot state (ibid.). The export of products from TRNC is only possible from Türkiye.

As a result of the rejection of the plan, the representation of Cyprus is done through the Greek Cypriots and there is no obligation of the representation of the Turkish Cypriots in the Parliament. Republic of Cyprus has 6 members in the Parliament, the members are composed of the Greek Cypriots. If the Annan Plan would have passed, the representation of the communities would have been equal to at least one third of the Cypriot seats (Vilotti, 2012, p. 53).

Similarly, Turkish could not become an official EU language as a result of the rejection. Even though the official language of the Republic of Cyprus is both Greek and Turkish, Turkish is not a working knowledge of the Union. The member states have possibility to inform the Council for the

translation of the EU Treaties to the minority languages; however there have not been such communication from the Greek Cypriot authorities regarding that (Vilotti, 2012, p. 55).

It can be referred that the Turkish Cypriots have lack of representation in the EU and Cypriot government. Even though, the Republic of Cyprus represents the whole island in the EU, it is unclear to say whether the Turkish Cypriots were prevented from the representation of willingly resigned from exercising these right (Vilotti, 2012, p. 57).

The membership of Cyprus was not based on the conditionality of reunification. Cyprus managed to become a member state to the EU by the internalization of the issue. North Cypriots continue to live with the dependence to Türkiye, isolated from the world. Although there have been some efforts to develop North Cyprus, not all the proposals have been enabled to be implemented. While Republic of Cyprus lost its interest to resolve the issue, the country focused on the benefits that can be acquired through EU membership. Accumulating its wealth and the presence of the European culture and values led the success of the Greek Cypriots to enter the EU without the support to the Annan Plan. The integration set a turning point for the country's development and enabled further political and economic integration within the EU.

4 TESTIMONIES

Testimonies are crucial to comprehend the events from a first-hand experience which further elaborates the past events by humanization. In the field of human rights, although statistical data have been providing a solid source, testimonies were relied on the evidencing the events (Patel, 2012, p. 236). This research, not only basing the thesis on the secondhand resources but also includes the first-hand accounts of the events experienced. While the testimonies are more subjective resources, they lighten the historical experience by involving emotions and personal experiences of the individuals, therefore, providing a more comprehensive approach. In order to analyze the testimonies of the individuals; collective memory, identity formation, traditions, political awareness and hopes and concerns of the individuals will be examined in the subsequent chapters.

4.1 Collective memory

In the historical narratives the collective memory possesses a significant place to grasp the impacts of the events in individual level as well as the community level. Recalling a past memory of an event by the individual requires consciousness which enables them to have the self-identity, while even the most individual experiences cannot be separated from the social context persons experience (Funkenstein, 1989, p. 6). The personal identities of the individuals belonging to the groups are constructed with a reference to the objects, people, and events (ibid.).

For the Greek community of Türkiye, descendants of the Greek immigrants in Greece and the Cypriots, the collective memory has been transcended throughout the years with the intergenerational narratives. In order to recall the participant testimonies with regards to collective memory, the question to share their knowledge on an historical event has been asked. The participants mentioned events such as Great Catastrophe, Wealth Tax, 6-7 September, 1963 conflicts in Cyprus, 1974 occupation of Cyprus.

Nevertheless, the collective memory in accordance with the certain events is at risk of being eradicated. Although, the time can be relevant factor on this, the traumatic events are also being hesitated to be repeated and transcended through the generations. Olick (1999) states that the externalization of the personal traumatic experiences can be objectified as narratives which enables them to affect larger portion in our societies (Olick, 1999, p. 345). Although, some individuals who directly experienced the events might be gone, the trauma of 6-7 September or 1974 occupation of Cyprus legitimizes the narratives that individuals produce for their collectivity.

During the interviews, Dimitri from Cyprus who has been injured during the 1974 Cyprus occupation stated the following while mentioning his hesitation to share the memory with others repeatedly: “I was shot when Türkiye invaded Cyprus. The hospitals in Cyprus wanted to cut my leg but my father took me to a hospital in Israel. So, I got a surgery there and that is how I am here today”. Although Dimitri was hesitant to give the interview in the beginning, he states that he values the interest of the young generation to learn about the past and sharing his story with the next generation with whom he emphasizes as ‘can make a change’.

Antigoni discovered the complete story from the memory of her grandmother with the details for the interview:

My grandmother has lived in a mixed village in Paphos where the Greeks were minority, but they did not have any problem and Turkish children were learning Greek while Greek children were learning Turkish... She had many close Turkish friends, and she could speak Turkish, although she has forgotten to speak, she can still understand. She blames Brits for the conflict between Turkish and Greek. Brits employed Turks as police officers to get them in clashes against Greeks to stop the liberation moves after 1950s (Antigoni).

The interview participants from Cyprus frequently mentioned their prosperous relations with the other community. Apparently, the relations were prosperous before the conflict with mixed villages, strong friendships, language exchanges, and familiarity with the culture of one another.

Since in the memory telling part of the interviews the interactions were repeatedly mentioned it is worthwhile to emphasize the current situation of interactions between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots.

None of the Greek Cypriots are regular travelers to north part of Cyprus or have not been in North Cyprus for years. The reasons given were as the followings: distance from their base, bureaucratic struggles at the checkpoints, and not to remember the painful memories of the past. However, the Turkish Cypriot interviewee stated that he frequently travels to south to meet with friends and his Greek Cypriot girlfriend. Despite the lack of community wide engagements, individual level interactions yet exist.

On the other hand, the fear of a small minority in a politically oppressed country to share the experiences relevant to the event and preserve it within the community is often observed throughout the interviews which as well rises the difficulty in recruiting interview participants.

The interviewee who belongs to the Greek minority in Türkiye expresses his opinions as follow:

Even if you interview other people from the community, they will never tell you the truth, they will talk as if everything in our community is working perfectly. However, even as a small community we have a lot of problems internally. A community which numbers to approximately 1500 members cannot even form a consensus about a decision within the community (Kostas).

He further elaborated on the fact that the Greek community of Türkiye is hesitant to share the internal struggles with the outsiders. He has given a recent example on the management of the community schools. In accordance with the Patriarch of Istanbul and demand of Greece, the three Greek minority schools of Istanbul are to be classified as primary, middle, and high school instead of all three of the schools including all levels of education. Therefore, the Arabic speaking Greek Orthodox can also be integrated within the community and contribute to the continuity of the Greek Orthodox community. However, the disagreement within the community persists which the interviewee states that the community is exclusive to include other ethnicities who are in Greek orthodox faith to keep the traditions and the community alive.

The declining numbers of the community puts the risk of collective memory to be forgotten. The interviewee describes the situation of the Greek minority as “a fish waiting to be killed”. He further asserts that the community will be extinct in twenty years that eventually the country will achieve its goal of eliminating the Greek elements from the country.

The historical events such as the Great Catastrophe when Greek Army was defeated and the Greeks had to dislocate to Greece, 1955 Pogrom in Istanbul or the occupation of Cyprus in 1974 holds significant places in the memories. Although the individual stories remain as much as the narrative is being told, the collective memory that is formed through the individual experiences remain in the history books, heritages, museums.

The correlation of the literature and the testimonies are observed with an individual glimpse of reflection of the events. Kostas states that her great grandfather who owned a telegram company had to sell the company to pay the Wealth Tax that is imposed upon the family. Although the history books and the press of the time has written on the churches that was put on fire by the rioters in Istanbul during 6-7 September Events, Kostas conveys that even though there has been no damage in her grandmother's property she has seen the burning of the Agia Triada Church from her window.

It is observed that the young interview participants have discovered their family story related to different events with an aim to share the story for the interview. This suggests that the personal memories regarding such events are vanishing with the next generations and temptation to selectively disregard the unfavorable experiences is observed.

Conversely, these adverse events also in some cases evoke a sense of longing for the past period during which the individual had encountered positive experiences as well. 55-year-old Anastasia transferred the story of her grandmother from Asia Minor. She states that her grandmother has lived in a Turkish-Greek village and both communities were harmonizing. Even though her father was killed by the Turkish bandit, she has never mentioned negatively about the Turks, even talking in Turkish to her grandchildren years after her immigration to Greece. Anastasia states that her grandmother has regularly conveyed the stories of her picturesque village in Asia Minor.

During the interview, the participants related to their transcended stories never mentioned negatively about the communal level experiences. Anastasia mentions that her grandmother having lived with the Turks never had problems, but the problem was the political interests of the states. In fact, the Greek participant from Istanbul indicates that the community has struggled and yet faces difficulties due to the strained relations between Türkiye and Greece.

Gedi and Elam (1996) put forward that collective memory is fabrication of individual memory that is suitable in a social context (Gedi & Elam, 1996, p. 47). The statement approves the fact that the personal memories are pieces of the collective memory that assisted the transcription of the historical events. When the state level or international dimension is set aside, the past events have also impact on the individuals in which the similar experiences of certain groups form the collective memory. The experiences with the collective memory research enable historians to humanize the events and a form to comprehend the different individual experiences of the events.

The stories of the Turkish neighbors trying to protect their non-Muslim companions are well-known narratives on the topic. Similarly, the interview participant Kostas mentioned that thanks to a retired military officer who was the neighbor of his grandmother misled the rioters by convincing them that there were no Greek residents in the neighborhood.

Although the interview participants frequently recalled the memories and stories, the second interview question on sharing a memory that affected the surroundings of the participant had revealed insights to the individualization of the developments while leaving a spot for the historical facts. The histories that tragically affected the individuals in the past and the next generations such as Holocaust asserts important assets for the non-repetition of the tragedies. In the case of Greek minority in Türkiye and the Cypriot communities, their fate revolved around the policies and actions of Türkiye. Nevertheless, fundamental key for a flourishing future is re-remembering, acknowledging and disseminating the memory.

4.2 Identity Formation

The identities are formed through the personal level experiences. Significant events and the narratives that circulate around us shapes our thoughts and behaviors. As Locke suggest the memory is consciousness in which the narrators are aware of the past actions. The memory delivers past self into the present, and it does not only exist in time but also through the time (Poole, 2008, p. 267). In order to comprehend the impact of such events on individuals how being an immigrant descendant, belonging to Greek minority in Türkiye or living in a divided island shaped their identity, the question on identity formation has been asked. The question also aims to reveal how individuals perceive current Greece-Türkiye relations have effect on their identity considering the past.

The Greek participant of Istanbul mentions that:

When you say Rum (Greek), no one can understand what it is, but it does not mean they have never heard... However, whenever there is a tension between Greece and Türkiye, we are getting nervous. It is not reflected to us directly, but the acerbity of the political language is very impactful (Kostas).

As the historical occurrences demonstrated, he expresses his community is being affected by the tensions between the states. Even though the Greeks as known as Rums are not foreigners, they have been associated with Greece frequently. Within the context of Greece and Türkiye relations, the Greek minority has been the target of the political language. Even though, the Greek minority faces eradication, reducing the hate speech and ethnicity targeting would decrease the possibility of non-repetition of the past events.

Anastasia differentiates the Greek immigrants from Asia Minor to Istanbul stating that the remaining Greek Minority of Türkiye are ‘Istanbulites’ which she illustrates as elite and rich compared to the Greeks of Asia Minor. She further elaborates that 1.5 million Greeks of Asia Minor encountered with 5 million Greeks in the motherland. “Today we all have someone in our ancestry that is from Asia Minor” she states. In fact, the Greek immigrants of Asia Minor contributed significantly to the culture and economy of Greece.

Cyprus, as a divided island, has a particular implication on the identity formation of the individuals. While there are efforts on the reconciliation for the probability of the future reunification, the island habitants are exerting the Cypriot identity that is an umbrella identity that could bring Turkish and Greek ethnic communities of the island under a common background. However, the identity formation for the individuals’ experiences of living in a divided island and the complexities on the general attempts to establish a national identity were articulated by the interview participants.

The Cypriot participant Sophia mentions that:

Living in a divided island made me have a bipolar identity...In middle school when I was learning the history of island, I was a Cypriot, not a Greek-Cypriot. I did not like Greeks and Turks... In high school, I became a Greek nationalist because of the history teaching. When I started the university, I had chance to learn about history of education. My professor showed us what Greeks, Turks and British have done to the island... After travelling and meeting people I changed my mind. We do not have a lot of similarities, but we do not have a lot of differences either... I want the north side of Cyprus back, but it is also the land of people there. I still have a long way to grow my opinion so I can be sure about the situation (Sophia).

Sophia, stating her changing thoughts regarding how living on a divided island shaped her identity considering the presence of Türkiye, she mentions the importance of the history teaching. Educating young generations with hostility to another country can boost stereotypes and prejudices against one another. Therefore, intercommunal schools can be established with the priority on analytical thinking, common understanding and respect without the biased knowledge of the history (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 59). Therefore, the Education as being a crucial tool to direct and disseminate the ideologies, has been an effective instrument to preserve the prejudices and hostility against the other not only in Cyprus but also in Greece and Türkiye.

Oftentimes, the national history teaching has been done through the educational system. The teachings present the persons what is theirs and what is not by further emphasis though national holidays, the political language, and memorials (Poole, 2008, p. 275). Likewise, the national history teaching in Cyprus, Türkiye or in Greece has projected the national memory through their educational

institutions. If the projection of the historical enemy has been portrayed as evil even contemporarily, the perception of the counterpart is likely to be unfavorable.

Living on the other side of the island, Hasan shares his thought regarding living in a divided island as follow:

Now there is a recognized state in south...Türkiye is there as well... But Turkish Cypriots are in between... We are always in search of our identity. Turkish, but not exactly Turkish; Cypriot reflects the geography and the culture. Therefore, we call Turkish-Cypriot to reflect the ethnicity and where we live in... The main phrase that describes us is being caught in the middle (Hasan).

Due to the political restraints, the Turkish Cypriots living in the North has been encountering challenges socially, politically, and bureaucratically. Living in a country that has been recognized only by Türkiye affects the definition of the nationality. Culturally being different from the Turks in Türkiye, living isolated and sharing a land with a different ethnicity in Cyprus generates problems in the definition of the identity. Facing with the challenges of the historical events, Turkish Cypriots are affected by the consequences of the past events which are up until today impactful in shaping their thoughts regarding the past.

On the contrary, adjacent affiliation of Turkish Cypriots with Türkiye by the Greek Cypriots distances them from the Turkish Cypriots while the efforts on formulating a common Cypriot identity have been on progress. Although, it is not attributable on Greek Cypriots on the mode of definition towards the other, Türkiye's rising endeavor over the island and Greek Cypriot representation for the whole island constructing a Turkish-Cypriot identity that is not adequately visible. During the interviews, Antigoni references the North Cyprus residents as Turkish while she mentions the Greek Cypriots as Cypriots complaining about the radicalization on both sides.

Identity of the individuals are shaped by the circumstances in their surroundings and the experiences they had in the historical trajectory. The identity question of the interview exposed the way interviewees interpret the history, distinguishing subgroups within their community, impact of the events on the general identity of the public and personal levels. The Greek immigrant descendant in Greece and the Greek interviewee from Türkiye explained their identity formation process with respect to Greece-Türkiye relations while Cypriots referenced division of the island and Türkiye's presence on the land.

4.3 Tradition and Heritage

The tradition is an intangible element that can be passed down to the next generations. The tradition is an element that defines an ethnic group. Yadgar (2013) defines that the traditions are born and

restructured by the individual adding the subjectivity and individuality (Yadgar, 2013, p. 456). Therefore, unlike one might think that the tradition should reflect a common element in a group, it enables the self-understanding (ibid.). Moreover, it is a dynamic element that individuals and communities can impose their interpretation (ibid.). For the Greek community in Türkiye and the Greek immigrant descendants, tradition upholds a significant place to elaborate on the transfer of the tradition as well as the presentation of it.

The Greek immigrant descendants were asked if their families have carried a tradition to their new home after immigration. The Greeks of Istanbul were asked if they publicize any tradition with a wider society. The question also revealed the essence of the heritage for the community members.

People know the Greek traditions, but they do not know that it is a Greek tradition... Just as we have the parts of Turkish tradition, Turks also have Greek traditions... The communities that lived with us has the similar traditions we have (Kostas).

It is acknowledged that the Türkiye and Greece share notable similarities in terms of culture. Due to the cohabitation on the same lands for centuries, the similarities are not unexpected. Despite the political disputes between the countries, Greece and Türkiye exhibit numerous commonalities owing to the Hellenic heritage that has been influential on the communities of Anatolia as well as on the Turks.

The participant from Istanbul stated that the Greek churches of Istanbul are open to public visit and charity sales are organized by the Greek schools. He has mentioned the recent public attention on the kermes in Fener Greek High School has been attributed to the public eagerness for an aesthetically fascinating building of Istanbul.

Although the other communities of Istanbul have cultural activities such as the folklore dance team of the Armenian community, unfortunately, the Greek community does not showcase cultural-artistic exhibitions and performances. This might be due to the limited size of the community.

Although this sub-chapter is on the tradition, the immigrant descendant interviewee mentioned a notable point that is relevant to the post immigration period of the Greeks in Greece. Anastasia explaining that in the past Asia Minor had more Greeks than the Greeks in Greece further states that:

The Greek refugees from Asia Minor were more intellectual than in Greece. 1923 Population Exchange enabled the Asia Minor Greeks to contribute to the development of the country... They opened business, shops, they started to produce... Even though, the government did not want them... They have been treated like strangers (Anastasia).

Indeed, as touched upon in the previous sub-chapter, the Greek refugees of Asia Minor were important assets that could contribute to the economy of a war-thorn country. Even though, Greece has struggled with accommodation of such a large population, in the long term, the Greek refugees have demonstrated their skills. the Howland (1926) mentions in his published work that the Greeks were the crucial constituents also in Türkiye with regard to their activeness besides commerce and finance but also in agribusiness management (Howland, 1926, p. 623). Furthermore, after the terrifying years of the war, the Greek refugees have contributed to the wealth of the country (ibid.).

She further states that the Turkish dishes were brought to Greece and formed the base of the Greek cuisine. Besides the cuisine, Anastasia claims that the importance of the children in her family has been distinctive from the Greeks of Greece. She affirms that Asia Minor immigrants were more modest and traditional, valuing their families and children. Undoubtedly, impact of the Greek refugees in Greece has been economically and culturally. The mobility and implantation of a large population into Greece transformed the country in various aspects.

Although the heritage and the traditions are two distinct elements, I argue that the heritage and traditions are interlinked as they both reflect the essentials of an ethnic group and fulfill the identity of a community.

Heritage is effective for the vitality of the communities especially in the politically oppressed parts of the world (Apaydin, 2020, p. 13). Because this work is based on the memory of the individuals, it deserves to mention the role of heritage in the memories. Although it is an abstract and subjective concept, the material culture and the solid heritage involves the memory (Apaydin, 2020, p. 16). Collective memory as Halbwachs suggest indicates two distinct occurrence which are personal experiences formed in social context and the representation of such events (Olick, 1999, p. 336). The representation can be museums, statutes, or historical sites. In regard to the mentioned framework of Halbwachs, the Greek heritage although the number of the remaining residents declined, the memory is preserved through the Greek structures such as the Greek Orthodox churches, schools, Byzantine ruins. The outnumbering churches belonging to Greek community in Istanbul compared to their population demonstrates the Greek heritage that the city encompasses. Assman (2013) distinguishes communicative memory in which individuals transmit memories of experiences and autobiographies through generations versus the cultural memory which is embodied on texts, monuments, objects, and other materials that can evoke past memories (Meckien, 2013).

The striking point he mentions could be attributed to the cultural memory of the community. In Türkiye, most commonly the archeological sites and ruins are referred as Roman and the word of Greek and Hellenic are avoided, often the Byzantine past of the location has been often overseen.

However, the tangible elements are crucial for the associative feeling of the Greek community to the land and re-remembering.

Furthermore, in connection with the preceding discourse, Kostas from Istanbul mentioning the churches and the Byzantine historical sites serve as tangible elements that demonstrates the lasting Greek cultural elements in the city, demand of the community to open a Byzantine Museum in Istanbul is foreseen by the authorities. Indeed, preservation of the Byzantine heritage signifies revitalization of the Byzantine aspirations of the Greeks regarding Istanbul according to the authorities. Kostas further states the problem that exist within the community:

The sites and the culture are making us live; however, we cannot make ourselves live... Even Turkish language can make us live... As much as we are here, we are also not here. This is very rare and strange... We seem as if we are not in the system but in fact, we are in the beginning of the system even if we are a small community... We need to tell that we are the essential elements of this area (Kostas).

Preservation and dissemination of the tradition has been differently for the Greek immigrant descendant and the Greek participant in Türkiye. While the Greeks immigrants have brought their tradition that is blended with that of Turkish and shared it with the locals, Greek residents of Istanbul do not actively share their traditions with a wider society. Although, in the past, the community has contributed greatly to the culture of Türkiye, the small community is not actively sharing their traditions in a manner that could affect the dominant culture.

Although the Cypriot respondents were not asked a tradition related question, the respondent Hasan mentions “being ethnically Turkish and culturally Cypriot, therefore being a Turkish-Cypriot” indicates that the communities of the island share certain traditions such as cuisine, language influence, and music. The distinct Cypriot identity was formed with the interaction of the communities that affected the traditions and the culture of both sides that currently communities although ethnically related, cannot be fully associated with the ‘motherlands’ in these terms.

The question sheds light on the continuity of the tradition in Greece that have arrived with the immigrants. Indeed, the immigration of a population in large numbers influenced the culture of contemporary Greece. Similarly, the small Greek community of Türkiye has been in interaction with Turkish culture and similarities are observable. However, despite the cultural eradication occurring also within the community, tangible heritages are held on by the members to remind themselves their connection to the soil.

4.4 *The EU*

As articulated in the first chapter of the research, the EU has been a dominating factor between the relations of Greece, Türkiye and Cyprus after 1990s. For the latter two, EU has become an actor involuntarily because of the involvement of the United Kingdom and Greece as well as Türkiye due to their close relations (Muftuler-Bac and Guney, 2005, p. 291). The objective of the EU not only affecting the state policies, but it also had effects on the individuals and communities as well. In align with that statement, the Greek community of Cyprus, immigrant descendants in Greece and Cypriot communities experienced and observed the transformations in the countries that are destined to be a member of the EU.

Türkiye's advancement had significant impacts on the Greek community members in Türkiye as the policies that are adapted were discussed in the previous chapter. The community members are aware of the changes that EU has fostered. Kostas describes the impact of the EU process on his community with the following:

The EU process enabled the properties to be returned for the families who have left from Türkiye. But it did not cause any change... In my opinion it was a useful policy, but no one wanted to return here. Because it was very late to come back... I appreciate this effort, but I believe this effort was because of the EU's insistence... These years Türkiye and Greece were like brothers, but I think it could not stay like this (Kostas).

Kostas sharing his disappointment regarding the issue, he mentions not only the prosperous Greece-Türkiye relations were temporary but also it was belated to pull back the immigrated ones.

The state level decisions and actions affect the individuals. Türkiye's advancement on minority rights had acknowledged impacts on the community. Even though the community is small in number, the government's plan to resolve an unjust issue from the past reveals the significant steps taken with the aim of becoming a member.

Anastasia mentions that "if you cut Türkiye from the middle, it can be a European country in West, but the Eastern part is very different from the West..." Although not directly answering the question, during the interview she opted for taking a stance on responding the questions by focusing on similarities and differences between the cultures. On the topics such as appearances, culture, the food; she mentioned that both countries are similar and pointing out to the similarities of the Western part of Türkiye that can enable it to become a European country with the membership.

For the Cypriot interviewees the question was asked to discover the role of EU for the possible resolution of the division. The 2004 referendum has been a turning point for the fate of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Although it has been accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots rejected

the plan with a high rate. De Waal argues that while Turkish Cypriots consented that they were ready for the reunification, the Greek Cypriots considered the fact that they were coping with an illegitimate occupying force in the North, as demonstrated by the UN resolutions and ECHR case judgment on the property issues (De Waal, 2018, p. 52).

Antigoni describes that Annan Plan decision was right basing her thought on thinking some points are not right.

I don't think if you want to resolve this problem, Annan Plan was going to resolve it. It is more complicated... We have lived under Ottomans and later Great Britain. When Cyprus was finally free in 1960, we were finally free. This is why they rejected the plan (Antigoni).

She mentions the fact that Greek Cypriots having lived under the rule of Ottomans and Brits for decades, they opted for the independence within themselves as a community.

Second point of the articulation has been on the property issue. The Annan Plan prospected the compensation or the return of the properties by the reunification. However, she expresses the public distrust on the foreseen agenda stating that the plan could not resolve the question on the property.

Thirdly, she points out to the missing people articulating Turkish forces kidnapped the considerable number of people from the island.

Dimitri states that the rejection of the plan has been the appropriate choice and Cyprus could be a different country today if the plan was accepted. He further emphasizes that the statement is his opinion rather than an absolute truth.

Sophia mentions that the Annan Project has been the closest alternative for the solution; however insufficient for taking the consent of both sides. She connects the rejection to the memory resilience of the events that the old generations are experiencing the trauma of the past events. She further argues that in the scenario that Annan Plan have been established, the past would repeat itself as in 1974. "14 years of co-living had not worked; they were close minded" she states. She resembles the past resolution options to 'communism' although, the resolutions on Cyprus were well-crafted in theory, they were inefficient in the application likewise the independence from the Great Britain in 1960.

On the other hand, Hasan from North describes the result of the referendum as a 'revolution' to overthrow the Denktas government. Indeed, the pressure from Türkiye that faces challenges to become an EU member state due to the division and public opinion on reunification had pressured Denktas to take a softer stance.

According to the interview findings, participants from Greek Cyprus had general tendency to state that the issues were not related to the Turkish Cypriots but the policies of Türkiye over the island. Dimitri states that:

We have nothing to do with these people, we used to live with them. Why cannot we live with them? Why do they not allow us? Türkiye wants to be here because of its location. They do not have interest anything or what is going on (Dimitri).

In the research study Georgiades (2007) conducted to elaborate on the public attitude, his findings points out that one-fifth of respondents expressed their mistrust towards the Turkish Cypriots while one-sixth of them have negative opinion on peaceful co-habitation with the other side; however, 43% of the respondents reported that Greek Cypriots as an ethnic community are not well-prepared to cohabit with Turkish Cypriots (Georgiades, 2007, p. 578). The research of Georgiades demonstrates a general positive public attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots while the resolution over the division is a distant prospect.

The relations between Türkiye and Greece and the situation of the communities were highly determined on the context of EU in 2000s. While positive developments occurred connected to Türkiye's determination for the EU, Cypriot communities have been challenged on forming a consensus around Annan Plan.

4.5 Hopes and Concerns

The hopes and concerns of the interviewees measures the opinion of the participants towards the issues that influences the possible future implications. Even though, the hopes and concerns are subjective and differentiate among persons, in conflict resolutions and policy developments, they have power to provide a guidance.

The situation of Greek minority in Türkiye is demonstrating the foreseen extinction of the community in Türkiye. Once being a major non-Muslim ethnic group of the region, the community attempts to survive with a small population currently. Although in occasional instances the issues that the community faces were resolved, some issues remain unresolved despite the accelerated legal adaptations Türkiye has taken for the EU membership.

Our schools are unorganized. In Zappion Greek School, the number of the students is 60 considering the school involves the primary, middle and secondary level educational levels. This is terrifying for the psychology of the students, learning the Greek language and the application of the system. As I mentioned, the levels should be gathered under one school. This way the students can interact more and psychologically better (Kostas).

The further issues on the education lays on the curriculum. In the Ottoman Empire, the schools that were established by the minorities and foreigners were operating independently where the curriculums in the schools were determined independently from the Ottoman authorities. In the new Republic, all the educational institutions were gathered under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. The new system has envisaged a national curriculum for all educational institutions which included the minority schools with a limited autonomy. Therefore, the minority schools are obligated to provide Turkish history, Turkish language, and geography lessons. Furthermore, the religious symbols such as the crosses from the school buildings and the pictures of the saints from the textbooks were removed. Furthermore, the schools are not allowed to provide lectures on the Byzantine history nor the Greek heritage in Türkiye (Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 2). “We cannot learn our history in school on this land... We are not allowed to learn our history... We are so here but at the same time we are not here.” states the interview participant reflecting his thoughts on the problems that Greek educational institutions encounter.

The concerns reside also in the realm of self-reflection. Even though the community is suppressed and in the edge of extinction, Kostas mentions the attitude that should have been taken by the Greek community:

60% of our community consists of elderly. We are struggling with survival... Living aside the numbers, we should show our culture, what we have done and who we are historically and culturally... We should show we were here and why we are not here anymore... we need to be seen (Kostas).

The further problem is within the unawareness of the young generations. The interviewee shares that a major part of the community is formed by elderly, the young generation who has the ability to further vitalize and share the culture are not eager in community-focused activities.

The Greek immigrant descendant interviewee states her demand of facilitation of real estate purchases for the Greek immigrant descendants and a special constitutional protection for the properties.

I would love to have a house in Istanbul or elsewhere in Türkiye, but I do not know why I cannot have a house in the origin of where my family is from... I hesitate because of the bureaucratic reasons and high inflation (Anastasia).

Anastasia, sharing her grandmother's stories and her expectations, has a longing to a past that she has never experienced herself; and to a land that her roots are from, yet has not lived on. Assman (2008) in his published study shares that the theorists such as Nietzsche, Halbwachs and Nora

distinguishes the memory from history that history puts distinction between the past from present and the future while the memory connects the past, present and the future (Assman, 2008, p. 61). Notwithstanding my divergence from critical historiography scholars, whereas the postmodern stage in the study of memory and history places the history and the memory complementary. Correlating with the study through the interviews, respondent's memory is yet alive that affects her identity, thoughts, and desires while this memory is explained and described by the history.

Secondly, she states her concerns regarding the declining numbers of the Greeks in Türkiye:

It has been one of the oldest policies of all Turkish governments to eliminate the Greeks... This must change... We cannot reverse the history... Greeks in Türkiye has good lives, but they are still a danger... Eventually, the small minority will fade away, and someone would have resolved the five hundred years of a problem (Anastasia).

"It is very good what the new generation is doing now. You know how to advise the next generations not to repeat it..." says Dimitri when starting his sentence. Even though, he states that there is a general tendency from both sides towards not to mention the events and re-remembering is painful, he has faith in the young generations.

They want to make the EU relations stronger and in case of a resolution EU will help us. Otherwise, why we are still in this situation? It is not so easy. What Türkiye has done in 1974 is not easy today if they dare to repeat it again because we are in the EU (Dimitri).

Although, he expresses his concerns regarding the repetition of the history and Türkiye's current interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, the role of EU in the relations with Türkiye and Cyprus complexify the probability of an invasion. In fact, the 'double majority' problem has been emphasized frequently on the conflict resolution for Cyprus which suggests the Turkish minority problem in the island and Greek-Cypriot minority in the region considering the geopolitical position of the Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye (Michael, 2007, p. 600). However, Cyprus conflict brought two main actors upfront: Greek Cypriots and Türkiye. The issue has raised concerns in EU institutions as well (ibid.).

Dimitri mentions the economic disparity between south and north of Cyprus. He states many families live in poverty in north. In fact, calculations with the methodology that is used to measure the poverty threshold in the EU countries, the ratio is 22.8 percent which places the Northern Cyprus along with Romania and Bulgaria for a comparison (Aygin, 2023). Nevertheless, a well-planned proposal on reunification would enable to gradual declination of disparities.

I have hope it is going to be resolved, but I have a concern on how it is going to be resolved but I have hope that one day we will be a reunited island... EU will have an important part of

the solution. EU is not only a financial institution... NATO would have a crucial part as well although Cyprus is not a member, Greece and Türkiye are. The solution would enable Türkiye to become a member of the EU as well (Sophia).

Cyprus has been a main obstacle for Türkiye's accession. The resolution had to be promoted by Türkiye. Michael (2007) proposes a reconciliation based on the increased interaction between the communities on faith, culture, and dialogue (Michael, 2007, p. 602). The initiative must be funded by the EU and the guidance by the Greek, Turkish, local, and European third and private sector efforts with the support among the Cypriots (ibid.)

I do not have hope for the reunification. We are obligated for the resolution because we are isolated. I remember every day the Cyprus issue in every aspect because of the limitations; however, the Greek Cypriots can continue their lives without the resolution. There needs to be a pressure and need for the resolution from both sides. Since they do not exist, probably the resolution will never happen... My only hope is to continue interactions so that no conflict occurs (Hasan).

Conversely, Turkish Cypriots struggle with the obligations naturally imposed by the unrecognition of the non-legal state in North Cyprus. The isolation from the international world diplomatically and economically along with the dependency to a country that is in an economic downturn with a rising authoritarianism positions the Turkish Cypriots in a limbo that is between the EU, because the Greek Cypriots represent the whole island with the membership and Türkiye because of dependence.

The concern of the Greek community member and the immigrant descendant has been on the decreasing number of the community which puts the one of the oldest communities in Anatolia region at the edge of extinction. However, the community faces major challenges in the education sphere. In the case of Greek Cypriots, the community perceives the resolution of the division to be occurred is unlikely within a short time frame. However, the participants express their trust on the EU for the resolution while having concerns on the presence of Türkiye in the island and the status of isolated Turkish Cypriots. The hopes and concerns of the public is a key for the future determination of the thriving plans.

5 CONCLUSION

The foundation of the Republic with democracy and secularism replacing an outdated Empire where the minority rights evolved around religious concerns and classification substituted by a new approach on the rights of the communities. The new approach, although not significantly diverging

from the Ottoman's 'Millet' system has given less autonomy to the minority groups. The fear of minority groups has possibility of betrayal, and the repetition of the history has been on place. Consequently, the minority groups were repressed by the legislation of the new state which aimed the legalization of the discrimination. With that purpose, individuals who belong to minority groups were restricted to reside in certain cities, travel, banned from practicing certain occupations, usage of their language, and equally operating in the financial sphere. One of the most brutal policies of the time has been Wealth Tax which aimed to eliminate the adverse effects of the World War II by imposing a particular tax on the wealthy section of the public. However, the policy was applied unequally, bearing enormous amount of debts on the minority populations, as a result, nonpayment leading to deployment of the individuals in the work camps for the payment.

In the Republic, particularly in the period of 1923-1950, duplicity has been the key in analyzing the approach of the state policy vis-à-vis non-Muslim ethnicities. The duplicity has been observed in the context of Muslimhood versus secularism and citizenship versus nationhood. The duplicity reveals the controversial technique of defining Turkish nationalism with the exclusive practices and inclusive discourses; however, the duplicity aimed to serve the interests of the political elite on a homogenized and loyal society (Goalwin, 2017, p. 16)

The new republic, diverging from its predecessor state embraced secularism. The principle has been the most influential one regulating the social sphere. The religion has been brought strictly under the state control, westernization was promoted. Nevertheless, the religion has been protected on determination of the inclusiveness in the nation. One striking example of this duplicity has been found on the 'Population Exchange' between Greece and Türkiye. The populations have been exchanged on the bases of the religion rather than the ethnicity. In consequence, groups who belong to different ethnicities but Muslim in Greece and Christians who belong to Turkish origin and practicing Turkish customs and practices were entitled to dislocate.

The second duplicity lays between the nationhood and citizenship. Citizenship allows the residents of the country to exercise their rights and enjoy the equal treatment of the state. However, in Türkiye, the abovementioned principles have not been applied equally. The attempts were made to create Turkish bourgeois class by excluding the non-Muslim population. Turkishness was achievable by Muslim ethnic groups but not open to non-Muslims.

Homogenization policy directed towards achieving a Muslim Turkish society. To achieve the nationhood, Turkishness was essential. To be Turkish, one had to be following the Muslim faith. Turkish citizenship and secularism have provided equalization of the individuals in theory; however, Muslimhood and Turkishness were on practice influential. Greek minority, remaining outside the

determined context were neither enjoying equal citizenship rights entirely nor were fully integrated due to their ethno-religious distinction despite the secularism.

The 1950 elections were milestone in the history of Türkiye. First, a new party came into the power, leaving the one-party days of the Turkish politics behind. Second, the new government has given priority to the rights and freedom. The second objective had positive outcomes on the minorities especially on the Greek minority which Menderes established close ties. However, the attitude of the government has been shifted with the rising tension in Cyprus.

Cyprus has been an island that was influential on the determination of the relations between Türkiye and Greece as well as the treatment of Greek minority in Türkiye significantly. Escalation of tensions in the island, Türkiye's intention on protecting Turkish Cypriots led nationalists of Türkiye to revolve around the Cyprus issue. Between the time periods 1950s and 1970s, Türkiye has taken a strong stance on the issue for the partition of the island (Camp, 1980, p. 70).

Struggling with the down warding economy and restrictions of the liberties gained were signaling the failure of the Menderes government in sustaining the golden era of its governance. Simultaneously, the rumors were on EOKA had the support of the Greek minority of Türkiye. Events erupted by the disinformation of Istanbul Ekspres's heading on bombing of Atatürk's home in Thessaloniki led thousands of rioters taking the streets of Istanbul and causing extensive damage on the properties of the minorities, mainly being the Greek minority. However, the events were planned by DP government with the collaborative implication of the secret services, student unions, associations, trade unions and government led organizations (Guven, 2005, p. 174).

The pressure on the Greek minority due to the strained relations of Greece and Türkiye or the conflict between the two communities in the island have not ceased with the independence of the island and three years after in 1963 the independent Cyprus collapsed with the intensified clashes. As a counteraction, Türkiye has abolished the 1931 Agreement which allowed the Greek citizens to reside in Türkiye. As a result, thousands of people were expelled within a short notice.

The course of the history of Greek minority in Türkiye demonstrates the effects of the tension between Greece and Türkiye. The relations not only impacting the minority but have been also highly determined by the Cyprus issue. However, it is worth to mention that the situation of Greek minority and the Cypriot communities were deemed in Türkiye's aim of forming a homogenous society. Presence of the Greek minority signified the constant threat in the unity of the state considering the differences in the ethnicity and the religion. Therefore, the worsening relation of Greece and Türkiye served as a justification to create the uniform society. Consequently, the adverse effects of the diplomatic relations are complementary to the minority policies of Türkiye rather than degrading the situation of Greek minority to one explanation.

Likewise the Greek community members, Cypriot communities have also suffered from the policies of Türkiye and the escalating tensions. Thus, two communities although not sharing a strong interpersonal bound, have experienced the impact of two forementioned factors unfavorably.

While Greek community of Türkiye was declining over time after 1964, the Cypriot communities continued living in division. However, third term of the minority policies and relations between Greece and Türkiye as well as Cyprus have been defined by the EU membership process. The process has had influence on the smoothening of the minority policies of Türkiye even though the Kurdish question was rising at the conjuncture.

Türkiye's endeavor to become an EU member state has set positive changes in the military power, democracy, and human rights of the country while the relations with Greece was becoming prosperous and Cyprus policy was becoming flexible. The new context of the relations had positive consequences on Turkish Cypriots and Greek minority of Türkiye.

Alternatively, Cyprus has been aiming to become an EU member state at the same time as Türkiye. The striking point has been the probability of admission of Cyprus into the EU without the reunification. Even though Türkiye has put effort on reunification of the island with the EU objective, Cyprus followed an independent EU path from the resolution. Athens have disentangled from the Cyprus issue recognizing the autonomy of the state while Türkiye admitted the 'Europeanization' of the problem (Koukoudakis, 2015, p. 92-93). Ultimately, Türkiye managed to start the accession talks with a pending membership status while Cyprus succeeding accomplishing the membership status.

To sum up, the minority policies of Türkiye, particularly policies directed towards the Greek minority were remarkably can be categorized with three time periods: First, 1923-1950 period that legislation and international arrangements were concluded with the purpose of a homogenized society. Second, Cyprus issue became influential on the treatment of Greek minority in Türkiye as well as the relations between Greece and Türkiye. Additionally, the policies started to affect Cypriot communities after the issue has acquired a greater international dimension. Third, the EU framework has shaped the internal and international policies of Türkiye, in parallel Cypriot communities have been encountered with a resolution idea on the edge of Cyprus becoming an EU member state.

Given that the thesis is in parallel with the historical course of the Greek minority in the Republic of Türkiye and the relations between Greece and Türkiye, the testimonies of the individuals provide invaluable insights to the elaborative reflection of the events and relations. In the studies concerning human rights, empirical investigation remains essential on the individuals who have experienced the collective pain of the political actions thus providing narrative-based evidence (Patel, 2012, p. 260).

The testimonies aligning with the literature have approved the impact of the events on the individuals and the communities. The personal experiences and opinions have demonstrated the historical facts and offered a personal aspect. The historical trajectory has had consequences on the identity formation of the individuals, representation and persistence of heritage and tradition, the individual perception in the historical contexts such as Türkiye-Greece and the EU, lastly the future expectation of the communities and individuals.

Consistent with the history, memories provide essential scripts as a complementary source. Oral histories, although have been criticized as being unreliable sources, they are essential on re-remembering of the disastrous events that have had effect on the societies. To illustrate, the Holocaust survivors sharing their testimonies reminds the cruciality of the actions sentimentally. The oral histories are conveyed within the family and the community involves the nonmaterial aspect that is not frequently mentioned in the written archives. The events of the holocaust will be remembered even after the passing away of the last witness. Similarly, Population Exchange, consequences of Wealth Tax, 6-7 September Pogrom, the conflict and occupation of Cyprus will continue to mirror the recorded texts through the oral histories and emotional aspect enables societies to remember and shape future policies accordingly.

The combine studies of second handwritten records through literature and the oral histories are often overlooked and perceived to be distant from each other. The literature chapter of this research revealed the policy changes on Greek minority within three chronological periods and the factors intervening in these phases such as Cyprus issue and the EU. The literature research has indicated the lack of studies on the certain events such as 1964 expulsions which has been a critical conjuncture on the presence of the Greek minority in Türkiye.

The studies on the Greek community have been diminished by the time the number of community members declined. Furthermore, the scholars have not directly addressed the commonality of the issues Greek community and the Cypriot communities encounter after the establishment of the Republic in academic research. Although the Greek community faced events due to the rising tension in Cyprus without having interference in the conflict and often community members being uninformed on the situation, the Greeks of Türkiye share the commonality in terms of treatment with Cypriots in Turkish policy changes. Although the Greek Cypriots and Greek of Türkiye are disassociated from each other, the rising conflicts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the island affected Greeks in Türkiye as they were regarded as the extension of Greek Cypriots and improvement of policies on Cyprus and the relations with Greece empowered the community to acquire the liberties on certain areas.

This research study introduces a new concept analysis on minority studies and sheds light on the research of the other minority groups in Türkiye and elsewhere. Even though, this study explained the minority policies through Greek minority concept of Türkiye, timeline categorization can be used also for the other minority groups such as Armenians in Türkiye or Albanians in Italy. Correspondingly, the study of minority group rights is correlated with the political historical context of the country. Additionally, diplomatic relations are determinants if a country is seen as the ‘motherland’ of the minority group.

The limitations on the research laid on the availability of the research sources on the certain topics such as 1964 expulsions and Wealth Tax. Surprisingly, the Turkish scholars had more research studies on the Greek minority topic studied through the thesis compared to the Greek scholars. Similarly, even though most of the Greek population in Greece contemporarily has a family member with an Asia Minor past, the challenges have been on the lack of knowledge on the family past. This suggests the Greek society is detaching from the Asia Minor past and the society is becoming less aware of the encountered problems of the small Greek minority. The collective memory on the Asia Minor and Istanbul is diminishing. This can be regarded with the Greece’s European focused international approach. Moreover, the political environment has been the concerns on the interviewee research in Türkiye. Despite being the oldest but smallest recognized minority group of Türkiye, the Greek minority is often hesitant to discuss their experiences and concerns in an interview.

Representation of the cultural memory could be one way of encouraging the minority groups to disseminate the knowledge on their ethnic group. Reluctance on the sharing of the oral histories can be overcome with the increased cultural activities that is funded by the policy maker actors.

Although this study displays a selective approach on the analysis of the events and the relations since the foundation of the Republic, different time periods can be analyzed for further research including the decline period of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Cyprus issue and the Greek minority problems seems to be noncorrelated in the near future, the historical effect of the issue on other minority groups can be studied to demonstrate a general policy tendency of Türkiye in a comparable method between the minority groups.

Similarly, the effect of the relations between Armenia and Türkiye or Israel and Türkiye and to which extent strained relations had implications on the Armenian or Jewish minority groups can shed light on the further conceptualization of the minority studies in Türkiye. However, these studies should be harmonized with the public opinion. Therefore, the research in combination of the historical political context with the oral histories reveal the unwritten effects of the political actions and decisions.

Three time periods have been explored in the study of Greek minority in the Republic of Türkiye. The first period refers 1923-1950 where the new Republic has been oppressive particularly against the Greek minority due to the distrust arising from World War I. The second period addresses 1950-1974 in which the Cyprus issue became a prominent determinant for the state of the Greek minority in Türkiye. After the diminishing numbers throughout the years, eventually advancement of the minority rights with the EU process. Throughout the policy changes, the relations with Greece have been influential. This is due to Türkiye's inclination on frequent association of the Greek nation state with the ethnic minority within the country. As Cyprus becoming a strong determinant in the second period, the Cypriot communities have been adversely impacted by the demands of Greece and Türkiye in the island.

Collective memories and experiences unveil the intercommunity view on the matters that has not been articulated on the literature while giving the personal reflection of the events in align with the historical context. The oral histories support to humanize the events that have especially affected the large proportion of a community.

The Greek minority of Türkiye is not an historical reminiscent; indeed, it possesses a cultural legacy that has founded in the origins of their ancestral lands today. Greece and Türkiye sharing a long history of reproachment, and disagreements had tremendous effects on the Greek community in Türkiye and Cypriot communities. The future of Cyprus resolution and the vitality of Greek minority in Türkiye prompt concerns; however, in successive occasions, can the states reflect upon the possible outcomes of their actions on the communities?

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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

For the descendants of the Greek immigrants from Türkiye:

- Can you please introduce yourself?
- Can you please share your knowledge on your family's connection to Asia Minor or Istanbul/Constantinople and the story behind their migration? To your knowledge, in which ways historical and political dynamics between Greece and Türkiye were influential on this?
- How being an immigrant descendant has shaped your identity with regards to the way you perceive the current Greece-Türkiye relations?
- Do you know any tradition or practice that your family carried to their new country after the immigration?
- How Greek immigrant descendants from Asia minor perceive the Turkish-Greek reproachment of 2000s? Is there a consensus? How do you think these developments were related to the EU accession process of Türkiye?
- Currently, there are around 3000 Greek minority members remaining in Türkiye (Hellenic Resources Network, n.d.) The number was 270.000 in 1922 (ibid.). What are your concerns regarding the future of Greek minority in Türkiye? Do you know any significant issue for the presence of the community?

For the Greek community members in Türkiye:

- Can you please introduce yourself?
- Can you please share your knowledge on your family's story in Istanbul? Can you share a political development/decision/event that adversely affected well-being of your family and community members in the history and a memory you experienced or heard from family members?
- How being a member of Greek community has shaped your identity with regards to the way you perceive current Greece-Türkiye relations?
- Do you present and publicize any traditions of your community with a wider Turkish society? Can you explain this tradition?
- Can you describe a positive policy change that occurred in the 2000s in Türkiye regarding the development of equal citizenship and the rights of your community? In which ways do you believe Türkiye-Greece reproachment and Türkiye's EU process had effect on this?

- What are your concerns regarding the future of Greek minority in Türkiye? Can you describe a significant issue for the community to be resolved yet?

Turkish:

- Kendinizi tanıtır mısınız?
- Ailenizin İstanbul'daki geçmişi hakkında bildiklerinizi paylaşır mısınız? Tarihte ailenizin ve cemaatinizin durumunu etkileyen bir siyasi gelişmeyi/kararı/olayı ve yaşadığınız ya da aile üyelerinden duyduğunuz bu duruma yönelik bir anıyı paylaşabilir misiniz?
- Türkiye'de Rum azınlığının bir üyesi olmak, mevcut Yunanistan-Türkiye ilişkileri göz önüne alındığında kimliğinizi nasıl şekillendirdi?
- Topluluğunuzun herhangi bir geleneğini yaşadığınız topluma sunuyor ve tanıtıyor musunuz? Bu gelenekten bahseder misiniz?
- 2000'li yıllarda Türkiye'de eşit vatandaşlık ve cemaatinizin haklarının geliştirilmesi konusunda meydana gelen olumlu bir politika değişikliğinden bahseder misiniz? Sizce Türkiye-Yunanistan yakınlaşması ve Türkiye'nin AB süreci bu konuda hangi açılardan etkili oldu?
- Rum cemaatinin Türkiye'deki geleceği konusunda endişeleriniz nelerdir? Cemaatiniz için hala çözülmesi beklenen önemli bir sorundan bahsedebilir misiniz?

For Turkish and Greek Speaking Cypriots:

- Can you introduce yourself?
- Can you please share your knowledge on your family's story in Cyprus? Can you share a political development/decision/event that adversely affected well-being of your family and community members in the history and a memory you experienced/heard from family members?
- How living in a divided island has shaped your identity with regards to the way you perceive the presence of Türkiye on the island?
- Can you elaborate on the current daily interactions between the Turkish and Greek community of the island? Do you or your family have any contacts from the other side and cross the Green Line regularly?
- How do you describe the past failed attempts on the reunification of the island? Do you believe Annan Plan of 2004 was a missed opportunity?

- Do you have hopes and concerns regarding the resolution of the division? In your opinion, what would be the role of EU in resolution considering the membership of Republic of Cyprus?

CONSENT FORM

Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna

Consent form – Interview

This consent form refers to the participation in an interview for the Master thesis of Hilal Öztürk, student at the University of Bologna, Italy. For further information, the student can be reached at the following e-mail address: hilal.ozturk@studio.unibo.it

1. I have given my consent to participate in an interview with the aforementioned student on __/__/__. I consent that information arising from this interview can 'only' be used for the research of the student with the sole purposes.
2. My participation as an interviewee was voluntary. There was no explicit or implicit coercion whatsoever to participate.
3. I have had the right not to answer any of the questions. If I have felt uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have had the right to withdraw from the interview.
4. I have allowed the interviewer to take written notes during the interview. I have also allowed the recording (by audio/video tape) of the interview. The recordings will be stored in accordance with GDPR, will not be shared anyone besides the interviewer. The recordings will be deleted by 31/03/2024.
5. I have been given right to participate in this interview anonymously with a pseudonym.
6. I have read and understood the points and statements of this form. I have had all my questions answered and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.

_____	_____
Participant's Signature	Date

_____	_____
Interviewer's Signature	Date

Izin formu-Röportajlar

Bu izin formu, İtalya'da Bologna Üniversitesi'nde öğrenci olan Hilal Öztürk'ün yüksek lisans tezi için bir mülakata katılımına ilişkindir. Daha fazla bilgi için öğrenciyle aşağıdaki e-posta adresinden iletişime geçilebilir: hilal.ozturk@studio.unibo.it

1. Yukarıda adı geçen öğrenci ile __/__/__ tarihinde bir mülakata katılmak için onay verdim. Bu görüşmeden elde edilen bilgilerin 'sadece' öğrencinin araştırması için kullanılabileceğini kabul ediyorum.
2. Görüşme yapılan kişi olarak katılımım gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Katılmam için açık ya da örtülü hiçbir zorlama olmadı.
3. Sorulardan herhangi birine cevap vermeme hakkına sahiptim. Mülakat oturumu sırasında herhangi bir şekilde kendimi rahatsız hissetmem halinde, mülakattan çekilme hakkına sahiptim.
4. Görüşmecinin görüşme sırasında yazılı notlar almasına izin verdim. Ayrıca görüşmenin kaydedilmesine (ses/video ile) izin verdim. Kayıtlar GDPR'ye uygun olarak saklanacak, görüşmeci dışında kimseyle paylaşılmayacaktır. Kayıtlar 31/03/2024 tarihine kadar silinecektir.
5. Bu mülakata takma bir isimle anonim olarak katılma hakkına sahiptim.
6. Bu formda yer alan hususları ve ifadeleri okudum ve anladım. Tüm sorularıma cevap aldım ve bu çalışmaya katılmayı gönüllü olarak kabul ediyorum.

Katılımcı İmzası	Date
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Görüşmecinin İmzası	Date
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